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INTRODUCTION
Implied covenants1 are obligations that are not expressly imposed by
a contract, but which courts nevertheless find are binding on one or more
1. Portions of this Article draw on the author’s prior articles on implied
covenants. See Keith B. Hall, Defining the Lessee’s Covenants to Drill and
Develop a Lease, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Special Institute on
Drafting and Negotiating the Modern Oil and Gas Lease (2018); Keith B. Hall,
Implied Covenants and Changing Technology, Proceedings of the 60th Annual
Mineral Law Institute (2013); Keith B. Hall, The Application of Oil & Gas Lease
Implied Covenants in Shale Plays: Old Meets New, Proceedings of the 32nd
Annual Energy and Mineral Law Institute (2011); Keith B. Hall, Implied
Covenants: Claims Under Mineral Code Article 122, 57 ANNUAL MIN. L. INST.
(2010); Keith B. Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing
Leased Lands, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010).

2019]

IMPLIED COVENANTS AND THE DRAFTING OF OIL AND GAS LEASES

403

parties to the contract.2 Courts routinely hold that oil and gas lessees are
bound by several implied covenants. This Article reviews the various
implied covenants that courts have recognized as binding on oil and gas
lessees and examines the justifications for recognizing those covenants.
The Article then discusses various issues that sometimes arise in implied
covenant disputes, including the remedies that are available, certain
procedural issues, and the question of whether a lessee must continue to
perform his implied contractual duties while a lawsuit over the validity or
continuing existence of the lease is pending. Finally, the Article addresses
the application of implied covenants in situations involving new
technology and discusses the application of implied covenants in shale
plays.
I. A PRIMER ON IMPLIED COVENANTS
Both within the oil and gas context and outside it, courts sometimes
conclude that parties to a contract are bound by implied obligations.3 In oil
and gas leases, however, implied obligations play a much larger role than
they do in contracts generally. The “Primer” Section of this Article
examines the reasons for this heightened role and provides the reader with
background on the law of implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
A. History of and Justifications for Implied Covenants
For more than 100 years, courts have held that a mineral lessee’s
duties include various implied covenants that are not expressly stated in a
lease. The earliest case to recognize the existence of implied covenants
may have been Stoddard v. Emery, an 1889 case in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated in dicta that oil and gas lessees are bound by an
implied covenant to reasonably develop the leased premises.4 Three years
later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again stated that a lessee was bound

2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “covenant” as an agreement or promise,
and an “implied covenant” as one which may reasonably “be inferred from the
whole agreement and conduct of the parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 443 (9th
ed. 2009).
3. An interesting case outside the oil and gas context is Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). The remainder of this Article cites
numerous examples of cases within the oil and gas context.
4. 18 A. 339 (Pa. 1889); see also PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER,
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 802 (prominent commentators
describing Stoddard’s dicta as being the origin of implied covenants).
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by an implied covenant of reasonable development,5 and just a few years
later, the same court held that lessees are bound by an implied covenant to
protect the leased premises against drainage.6 Ohio soon followed suit in
recognizing implied covenants,7 as did the United States Eighth Circuit in
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,8 a decision which is recognized by several
commentators as one of the leading cases on implied covenants.9 Today,
every state with any significant amount of oil and gas jurisprudence has
recognized the existence of implied covenants.10
Implied covenants exist with respect to contracts generally and are not
unique to oil and gas leases. Indeed, in most states, the basic law of
contracts provides that all parties are bound by an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.11 But that is a very general duty. With respect
to oil and gas leases, courts hold that oil and gas lessees are bound by
5. See McKnight v. Manufacturers Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892).
6. See Kempner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896).
7. See, e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897) (recognizing
implied covenants to reasonably develop the premises and to protect against
drainage); see also Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
8. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
9. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802 (describing Brewster as
“landmark” case); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed.
2009) (describing Brewster as a “leading case”); Jacqueline S. Weaver, When
Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing
Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491, 492 n.6 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Bonds v. Sanchez O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 44546 (Ark. 1986); Garman v. Conoco, Inc. 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 154, n.42 (Tex. 2008);
Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445 (Pa. 2001); Smith v. Amoco
Production Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001); Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d
503, 507 (Mont. 1991); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464 S.E.2d 728, 733 (W. Va.
1995); Meisler v. Gull Oil, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Ridl
v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 789 (N.D. 1996); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48
N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897); Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 330 (Okla. 1994);
Continental Oil Co. v. Blair, 397 So. 2d 538, 540 (Miss. 1981); Caddo Oil & Mining
Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 717, 64 So. 684, 690 (1914).
11. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in court
opinions from virtually every state, as well as in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205. An exception is Texas,
which does not recognize a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, though it
does recognize the existence of implied covenants in oil and gas leases. City of
Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000) (no general duty of good
faith and fair dealing); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268
S.W.3d 1, 18-19 (Tex. 2008) (discussing implied covenant to protect against
drainage).
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several implied covenants that include much more specific duties. Further,
implied covenants seem to play a bigger role in the law of oil and gas
leasing than in general contract law.
The reason that implied covenants play a more significant role in oil
and gas leases than in some other contracts is probably due to a particular
characteristic of oil and gas leases. Namely, because of the complexities
and uncertainties involved in oil and gas exploration and development,
leases seldom state how many wells the lessee will drill, when and where
he will drill, or to what depth he will drill.12 Similarly, leases usually do
not specify what a lessee will do to protect the leased premises against
drainage or to market any product that is found. All these things are left to
the discretion of the lessee, even though these aspects of the lessee’s
performance are critical to the ultimate benefit that the lessor receives from
the lease transaction (particularly given that a major part of the benefit
allocated to the lessor is the right to a royalty based on production).13 One
early commentator stated, “It is doubtful if any other character of legal
instrument can be found in which one of the parties has so much
potentially at stake with so little express contractual protection.”14 It is this
characteristic of oil and gas leases that provides a “practical” explanation
of why courts hold that lessees are bound by implied covenants.
Although implied covenants are universally recognized in U.S. oil and
gas law, authorities have disagreed about the theoretical justification for
such covenants. One theory is that a public policy favoring production of
oil and gas is a valid justification for implied covenants.15 But two other
12. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore,
Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST.
177, 194 (1976) (“Because there are many unknowns involved when the lease is
executed, it is understood that much must be left to the judgment and discretion
of the lessee.”); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1905)
(noting impossibility of the lease itself stating how many wells should be drilled
because that would depend “upon future conditions, which could not be
anticipated with certainty” when the lease was entered).
13. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore,
Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST.
177, 194 (1976); see also Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants Claims Under Article
122, 57 ANNUAL INST. ON MIN. L. 172, 173-74 (2010).
14. A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and
Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV. 399, 399 (1933).
15. See, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 779
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Jacqueline L. Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law
Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1489-90
(1981); see also Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Bruce
M. Kramer & Chris Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil & Gas
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theories are more common.16 One of these more common theories is that
implied covenants fill gaps in contracts, giving particularized expression
to the parties’ own implicit intent. Thus, courts do not impose implied
covenant obligations on lessee. Instead, the court merely finds the common
intent of the parties. Under this theory, implied covenants are implied-infact. The other common theory is that courts impose implied covenants on
lessees as a means to promote fairness.17 Under this theory, implied
covenants are implied-in-law.18
In the vast majority of cases involving implied covenant disputes, the
theoretical basis of implied covenants is merely an academic question. The
parties’ dispute will turn either on the scope and extent of the lessee’s
implied covenant duties, on some procedural issue relating to implied
covenants, or on some issue unrelated to implied covenants, not on
whether the covenant at issue is implicit in the parties’ contractual intent
or imposed as a matter of law by courts. Nevertheless, in rare cases, the
theoretical basis of implied covenants will determine the resolution of a
dispute. For example, in Smith v. Amoco Production Co., the court had to
determine whether a lessee’s implied covenants were implied-in-law or
implied-in-fact because, reasoned the court, a different statute of

Leases: Some Needed Changes for the 80’s, 46 LA. L. REV. 787, 790 (1985); see
also Taussig v. Goldking Properties Co., 495 So. 2d 1008, 1014 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (stating that the implied covenant of reasonable development serves public
policy), writ denied, 502 So. 2d 111 (La. 1987).
16. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the
Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10, at 9 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 455 (Pa.
2001) (referring to fairness); see also David E. Pierce, Exploring the
Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. §10, at 9 (2002).
18. One oil and gas law treatise notes that there probably is some truth to both
the implied-in-fact and implied-in-law theories. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note
4, at § 803. The same treatise states that implied covenants can be justified by the
general principle of cooperation that exists in the contract law of most states.
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802.1. But in Louisiana, the highest court
has found a different justification. Although Louisiana recognizes an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contracts, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that the implied duties in oil and gas
leases are particularized expressions of Louisiana Civil Code article 2710’s
requirement that a lessee use the “thing leased as a good administrator.” See Frey
v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1992); see also LA. REV. STAT.
§ 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018).
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limitations would apply depending on whether the covenant was based on
the implied intent of the parties or on a rule of fairness imposed by law.19
B. The Standard of Conduct for Compliance with Implied Covenants
With respect to implied covenant duties, lessees are not held to a
fiduciary standard,20 and they are not required to exercise perfect
judgment.21 On the other hand, a lessee’s discretion is not unfettered.
Courts universally hold that oil and gas lessees are required to act as
reasonably prudent operators, taking into consideration both their own
interests and those of their lessors.22 This modern description of the
“reasonably prudent operator” standard is very similar to that stated in a
1905 case that arose in Kansas, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc, Co.23 Brewster
stated, “Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both
lessor and lessee, is what is required.”24
Depending on one’s viewpoint, the reasonably prudent operator
standard is either the standard of conduct that applies when determining
whether the lessee has complied with each one of several implied
covenants to which lessees are bound, or the reasonably prudent operator
standard itself is the sole implied covenant, though there are several
different types of situations that recur with sufficient frequency that it is
19. 31 P.3d 255, 265, 269-76 (Kan. 2001).
20. See, e.g., Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1996)
(under Illinois law, lessee does not owe fiduciary duties to lessor); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 31:122 (mineral lessee is not a fiduciary).
21. See Davis v. Ross Production Co., 910 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ark. 1995)
(“due deference should be given to the judgment of the lessee,” but the lessee
must exercise “sound judgment”); Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d
1010, 1015 (Kan. 1990) (lessee must act as a reasonably prudent operator, but its
actions should not be judged with the benefit of “hindsight”).
22. See Hite v. Falcon Partners, 13 A.3d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011);
Appeal of Baird, 6 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 1939); Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co.,
80 S.E. 368, 370 (W. Va. 1913) (lessee must act as a reasonably prudent operator
and consider interests of both itself and lessor); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 (mutual
benefit and reasonably prudent operator standard).
23. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
24. Id. at 814. Although earlier implied covenant cases did not give as full a
description of the standard now called the “reasonably prudent operator” standard,
the standard imposed by those earlier cases also was one of reasonability. See,
e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897) (recognizing “implied
covenant that the lessee shall reasonably develop the lands and reasonably
protect” against drainage).
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useful to discuss the lessee’s implied duty in each of those types of
situations as being a separate implied covenant. Thus, the text below
discusses the lessee’s implied duties as being separate implied covenants.
C. The Most Commonly Recognized Implied Covenants
There is substantial similarity between the particular implied
covenants recognized by different jurisdictions and various commentators.
Some of the implied covenants most frequently recognized in
jurisprudence or commentary are covenants to: (1) promptly drill an initial
test well; (2) reasonably develop the premises; (3) conduct further
exploration; (4) protect against drainage; (5) diligently market minerals;
and (6) restore the surface.25 Nevertheless, there are some differences in
the implied covenants that different jurisdictions recognize.26
Further, different jurisdictions sometimes use different terminology to
describe implied covenants that are the same in substance.27 For example,
25. See, e.g., JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL (6th ed.
2014). Professor John Lowe states that common implied covenants include the
duties to test, develop, explore, protect, and market. See id. at 313. He also
mentions an implied covenant of diligent and prudent operation, though he notes
that it largely overlaps other implied covenants. See id. at 348.
The implied covenant of surface restoration also frequently is discussed in
commentary. See e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases—Past, Present and Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 658-60 (1994); Keith
B. Hall, The Application of Oil & Gas Lease Implied Covenants in Shale Plays:
Old Meets New, Proceedings of the 32 ANN. ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 304 (2011).
26. Some have recognized an implied covenant to restore the surface of the
land to its original condition after the lease is complete. See Bonds v. SanchezO’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Ark. 1986), and some have rejected
such an implied covenant. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc.,
893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005). Some courts have recognized an implied covenant of
further exploration. See Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo.
App. 1984), while others have rejected such a duty. See Sun Exploration &
Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989).
27. For example, Texas recognizes implied duties to develop the premises,
protect the leasehold, and administer the lease. The duty to protect against
drainage is included in the duty to protect the leasehold, and a duty to reasonably
market oil and gas is part of the implied covenant to administer the lease. See
Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001). Colorado recognizes
four implied covenants: (1) to conduct exploratory drilling; (2) to develop the
leased premises after discovering resources that can be profitably developed; (3)
to operate diligently and prudently (which includes an implied covenant to
market); and (4) to protect the leased premises against drainage. See Garman v.
Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994).
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the Texas Supreme Court sometimes states that there are three implied
covenants—covenants to (1) develop the premises, (2) protect the
leasehold, and (3) manage and administer the lease.28 But a duty to protect
against drainage is part of the general duty to protect the leasehold;29 a
duty to market is part of the duty to manage and administer the lease;30 and
a duty to explore may be included in the duty to develop.31
1. Covenant to Drill a Test Well
Early in the history of the oil and gas industry, several courts held that
a lessee had an implied duty to drill at least one test well on the leased
premises relatively soon after the lease was executed.32 The courts reached
this conclusion in part because many leases provided for only a nominal
bonus, so that the lessor might receive virtually no benefit from the lease—
not even the benefit of someone having tested his land—in the event that
the lessee did not drill. The absence of benefit to the lessor raised issues
of fairness, as well as the possibility that the transaction constituted an
illusory promise, unless the lessee had an implied duty to drill. But lessees
often were not prepared to promptly drill, so they began drafting their
leases to include delay rental clauses.33 These clauses provided that, if the
28. Sun Exploration and Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204
(Tex. 1989); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
29. Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981);
see also ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS at 5-32 (2015 LexisNexis).
30. Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001);
Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 n.1 (Tex. 1981); see
also ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
at 5-5 (2015 LexisNexis).
31. Sun Exploration and Production Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204
(Tex. 1989); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959); see also ERNEST
E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS at 5-30 thru
5-31 (2015 LexisNexis).
32. See Gary B. Conine, Speculation Prudent Operation, and the Economics
of Oil and Gas Law, 33 Washburn L.J. 670, 683 (1994); see also, LOWE, supra
note 25 at 202-3, 314 (4th ed. 2009); Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Littler, 70 N.E.
363, 366 (Ind. 1904).
33. See Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics
of Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 684 (1994); Hite v. Falcon Partners,
13 A.3d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332
F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2004). Lessees began using delay rental
clauses early in the history of the oil and gas industry. For example, at least three
reported cases from the author’s home state of Louisiana deal with leases granted
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lessee had not begun drilling by the first anniversary of the granting of the
lease, the lessee could pay “delay rentals” to defer or delay its obligation
to drill a test well.34 Today, almost every lease contains a delay rental
clause, unless the lease is a paid-up lease.35 Accordingly, the implied
covenant to drill a test well is rarely litigated.36
2. Covenant to Reasonably Develop
The implied covenant of reasonable development requires the lessee
to drill as many wells as are reasonably necessary to develop a proven
formation—that is, a formation where drilling has confirmed the existence
of oil or gas in paying quantities.37 The implied covenant of reasonable
in early 1901 that contained delay rental clauses. See Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La.
1023, 42 So. 489 (1906) (lease granted in March 1901); Jennings-Heywood Oil
Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 119 La. 793, 44 So. 481 (1907) (lease
apparently granted in early 1901); Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co. v. JenningsHeywood Oil Syndicate Co., 115 La. 107, 38 So. 932 (1905) (lease granted in
1901); see also Saunder B. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1916)
(leases granted in 1909); Busch-Everett v. Vivian Oil Co., 128 La. 886, 55 So.
564 (1911) (lease granted in 1909).
34. See, e.g., Kachelmacher v. Laird, 110 N.E. 933, 935 (Ohio 1915).
35. A “paid -up lease” is “[a] lease effective during the primary term without
further payment of delay rentals, the aggregate of rentals for the entire primary
term having been paid in advance.” PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, 8
WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW 738 (2018) (hereafter, the “MANUAL OF
OIL & GAS TERMS”). Sometimes a paid-up lease will include a delay rental clause
and the lessee will simply pay all delay rentals at the start of the lease. Other times,
the lease will not contain a delay rental clause, and the lease will state that it is a
paid-up lease. Sometimes the lease will contain neither a delay-rental clause nor
a statement that the lease is a paid-up lease, but this method of drafting a paid-up
lease should be discouraged because a court might conclude that the implied
covenant to test has not been negated. See infra Section III(A) of this Article.
36. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 812; see also Patrick H.
Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market
Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 177, 179 (1976)
(“The implied covenant to drill an initial well is no longer of significance because
the typical lease today terminates automatically if a well is not drilled or excused
by delay rentals within a fixed period.”).
37. Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 (Colo. App.
2003); Wilds v. Universal Resources Corp., 662 P.2d 303, 306 (Okla. 1983);
Clifton v. Koontz, 324 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tex. 1959); McKnight v. Manufacturers
Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502,
505 (Ohio 1897); Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va.
1913); see LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (“Essentially, the relevant
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development appears to be the first implied covenant to be recognized by
courts,38 and it seems to be universally recognized. Because the duties
associated with this implied covenant relate to proven formations, this
covenant does not apply until after oil or gas is found in paying
quantities.39 Further, because a reasonably prudent operator would not drill
an unprofitable well merely to drain a proven formation more quickly, this
implied covenant does not require a lessee to drill wells that likely would
be unprofitable.40
The Louisiana Supreme Court described the implied covenant of
reasonable development in 1914 in Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers’
Oil Co.41 The court stated:
It is an implied covenant of every lease of land, for the production
of oil therefrom, that, when the existence of oil, in paying
quantities, is made apparent, the lessee shall put down as many
wells as may be reasonably necessary to secure the oil for the
common advantage of both lessor and lessee. Whatever ordinary
knowledge and care would dictate, as to the proper thing to be
done for the interest of the lessor and lessee, under any given
circumstances, is that which the law requires to be done, as an
implied stipulation of this lease.42

cases hold that after production in paying quantities has been obtained from a
mineral formation, it is the duty of the lessee to develop the producing formation
in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator taking into consideration both its
own interests and those of the lessor.”).
38. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 802.
39. See Baker v. Collins, 194 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Ill. 1963) (“After the discovery
of oil or gas in paying quantities, the law … implies a duty on the part of the lessee
to reasonably develop the premises….”); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at §
832; see also LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (stating that, for both
implied covenant to reasonably develop and implied covenant of further
exploration, “there must be discovery in paying quantities to make the obligations
operative.”); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 64 So. 684, 690 (La.
1914).
40. 194 N.E.2d at 355 (there was a duty to develop “so long as the enterprise
could be carried on at a profit”); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896)
(lessee is not required “to put down wells that will not be able to produce oil
sufficient to justify the expenditure”); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 832.
41. 64 So. at 690.
42. See id. (quoting W. THORNTON, THE LAW RELATED TO OIL AND GAS §
111 (2d ed. 1904)).
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The implied covenant of reasonable development, as contemplated
herein,43 does not in itself require the lessee to drill exploratory wells in
unproven areas, though the lessee nevertheless may have a duty to do so
in certain circumstances, as discussed in the next section.44
3. Covenant of Further Exploration
Some courts have held that lessees are bound by an implied covenant
of further exploration that is a separate obligation from the implied
covenant of reasonable development.45 Like the implied covenant of
reasonable development, the implied covenant of further exploration does
not apply until after oil or gas is discovered in paying quantities.46 But
unlike the covenant of reasonable development, which requires a lessee to
reasonably develop a proven formation, the implied covenant of further
exploration applies to unproven areas.47 This implied covenant requires a
lessee to conduct further exploration of unproven areas to the extent that a
reasonably prudent operator would do so, taking into consideration the
mutual benefit of the operator and lessor.48
Recognition of an implied covenant of further exploration is much
more recent than the recognition of an implied covenant of recent
development. Further, an implied covenant of further exploration is not as
widely accepted as several of the other implied covenants. Perhaps the
earliest significant discussion of an implied covenant of further
exploration dates back to 1956, when a prominent commentator argued in
a law review article that that an implied covenant of further exploration

43. As noted in Section I(C)(3), courts do not always distinguish clearly
between the duties of reasonable development and further exploration.
44. But see infra notes 50-53 and the accompanying text (noting that some
courts have imposed duties to duties to explore in unproven areas—duties that
commentators and other courts would describe as duties associated with an
implied covenant of further exploration—even while characterizing the
exploration duty as being included under the implied covenant of reasonable
development).
45. See e.g., Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
46. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 841; see also LA. REV. STAT.
31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018) (stating that, for either the implied covenant to
reasonably develop or the implied covenant of further exploration to apply, “there
must be discovery in paying quantities to make the obligations operative”).
47. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt. (WEST 2018).
48. See Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).

2019]

IMPLIED COVENANTS AND THE DRAFTING OF OIL AND GAS LEASES

413

exists, or should exist.49 Some other commentators promptly expressed
disagreement,50 and controversy over this implied covenant continued
over the decades.51 Further, relatively few courts have expressly
recognized an implied covenant of “further exploration” by name.52
Nevertheless, the implied covenant of further exploration is more
important than might be suggested by the relatively small number of courts
that have expressly recognized such a covenant. First, this implied
covenant is frequently discussed in commentary,53 which may influence
courts and future litigants. Further, in addition to the courts that have
expressly recognized an implied covenant of “further exploration” by
name, several courts have applied other legal theories to reach results or
impose duties similar to those one would expect by application of such an
implied covenant. For example, some courts, including those in
Oklahoma, have concluded that a lessee could be deemed to have
abandoned its lease rights as to a portion of the leased premises that the
lessee has not developed or explored for an extended period of time.54
Moreover, although commentators typically distinguish between an
implied covenant of reasonable development and an implied covenant of
further exploration, courts do not always clearly distinguish the duty or
alleged duty at issue. For example, although the Texas Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the existence of an implied covenant of further
exploration by name,55 the language of the Court’s cases seems to suggest
that the duty of “reasonable development” could include a duty to explore

49. See generally Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration,
34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956); see also Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further
Exploration: A Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 179 (1958).
50. See, e.g., Earl A. Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further
Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1959).
51. See KUNTZ: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 62.1
(discussing controversy over the existence and nature of the implied covenant of
further exploration).
52. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372-73 (Colo. App. 1984)
(expressly recognizing a duty for further exploration).
53. See, e.g., MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 841; see also Keith B.
Hall, The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010).
54. See Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 253 P. 33, (Okla. 1927) (Recognizing
abandonment of lease rights). But see Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 A.2d
441, 449 (Okla. 1981) for a rejection of an “implied covenant of further
exploration,” at least by name.
55. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959).
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new areas.56 Indeed, some prominent commentators have concluded that
Texas recognizes “the substance” of a duty to explore as part of the duty
to reasonably develop.57 It may be difficult, though, for a lessor to prevail
in a suit complaining about the failure of a lessee to drill a well to an
unproven formation because the Texas Supreme Court has held that, in
any reasonable development case, whether the lessor is complaining about
the lessee’s failure to drill an additional well to a proven formation or an
unproven formation, the lessor must prove that the undrilled well probably
would have been profitable.58
In Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., the Ohio Supreme
Court recently held that, “under Ohio law concerning oil and gas leases,
there is no implied covenant to explore further separate and apart from the
implied covenant of reasonable development.”59 The Court’s discussion
can be read, however, as suggesting that a lessor would not be precluded
from basing an alleged breach of an implied covenant of reasonable
development on a failure to explore new formations. For example, the
Court stated, “We also note that that the implied covenant of reasonable
development is well suited to address the primary driver of the
Landowners’ interest here, namely the emergence of new drilling
technologies permitting production from deep strata that could not be
obtained before.”60
Somewhat similarly, several Louisiana decisions arguably have
imposed an obligation to explore unproven areas,61 even though the courts
56. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS at 5-31 thru 5-32 (2015 LexisNexis).
57. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 815.
58. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959).
59. 95 N.E.3d 382, 388 (Ohio 2018).
60. Id. at 388 (The lessor originally had alleged breaches of an implied
covenant of reasonable development and an implied covenant of further
exploration. At the Ohio Supreme Court, the lessor chose to rely only on its theory
that the lessee had breached an implied covenant of further exploration).
61. See Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants: Claims Under Mineral Code
Article 122, Proceedings of the 57th Annual Mineral Law Institute (2010) at 1836 (noting that some commentators assert that Louisiana courts implicitly
recognize a duty of further exploration, and that several decisions can be
interpreted that way, but that there are certain ambiguities in this purported “line”
of cases: one of the cases involved a lease with a clause that expressly requiring
further exploration; two others made their statements about a duty to test in dicta;
and, in one of the cases, Carter, there was testimony from which the court could
have concluded that the area where no drilling had occurred was within a proven
formation). See also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 845.4 (“Louisiana
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reached their decisions based on a duty that they characterized as a duty to
“reasonably develop” the leased premises.62 Those who say that Louisiana
recognizes an implied obligation of further exploration typically point to
a line of cases headed by Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.63 In
Carter, a fault crossed the leased premises. The lessee had drilled wells
and developed the property on one side of the fault, but not the other. The
lessor demanded that the lessee drill on the other side, but the lessee did
not do so. The lessor sued for lease cancellation. The trial court granted
partial cancellation, dissolving the lease as to the portion of the property
that had not been developed. The lessee appealed the order of partial
cancellation. The lessor did not appeal the trial court’s refusal to order
complete cancellation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, after reviewing the evidence
and concluding that it showed that a reasonably prudent operator would
have drilled wells on the side of the fault that had not been developed.
Some of that evidence suggested that the proven field, which the lessee
had developed on one side of the fault, likely existed on both sides of the
fault. Thus, the Court could have simply based its decision on the lessee’s
implied duty to reasonably develop a proven field of oil or gas after
production from the field is established in paying quantities. But the
Court’s opinion included the following language that suggested the
existence of a duty to explore unproven areas:
The principle, as we understand it, is that development of every
part of the lease is an implied condition. Therefore, whether the
undeveloped portion be a single tract remote from the rest, or a
consideration portion of a very large tract, or the east one hundred
acres of a tract of 160, it is an implied condition that the lessee

courts are probably the most severe in the country in enforcing an implied duty to
explore further.”).
62. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt (WEST 2018); cf. Thomas A. Harrell, A
Mineral Lessee’s Obligations to Explore Unproductive Portions of the Leased
Premises in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 387, 390 (1991) (noting that Louisiana
courts have referred to the lessee’s obligation to reasonably “develop” the
premises both when discussing the obligation to develop proven reservoirs and
the obligation to explore non-productive areas). Indeed, the case that some
commentators point to as being the leading case that establishes a duty of further
exploration in Louisiana ─ Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26
(1948) ─ refers to the issue in the case as being whether the lessee had reasonably
developed the leased property.
63. 36 So. 2d 26 (1948).
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will test every part.64
Such language, assuming it was not dicta, effectively imposed an implied
duty of further exploration.
A question whose answer might vary by jurisdiction is whether a
lessor who alleges a breach of an implied covenant to explore a new area
must prove that the new area likely contains oil or gas in paying quantities.
It appears that such proof would be required in Texas.65 But an appellate
court in Colorado stated that a plaintiff need not show that an exploratory
well probably would be profitable.66 Instead, a plaintiff only needs to show
that a reasonably prudent operator would drill an exploratory well.67 In
states that require the plaintiff to prove that an exploratory well probably
would have been profitable, that required element of proof makes it
challenging for lessors to prevail in a claim that the lessee has breached a
duty to conduct further exploration.
4. Covenant to Protect Against Drainage
The implied covenant to protect against drainage requires the lessee to
take reasonable action to protect the leased premises against substantial
drainage from wells on nearby properties.68 The implied covenant to
protect against drainage is widely recognized, and it is one of the earliest
of the implied covenants to be recognized.69 The implied covenant to

64. See 36 So. 2d at 29 (quoting Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 253 P. 33
(Okla. 1927), a case in which the issue was whether the lessee had abandoned a
portion of the leased premises, and not whether a duty of further exploration
existed or whether such a duty had been reached).
65. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.
1990); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959).
66. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984).
67. Id.
68. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1,
17 (Tex. 2008); Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137
(Colo. App. 2003); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464 S.E.2d 728, 733 (W. Va. 1995);
Rogers v. Heston Oil Co., 735 P.2d 542, 546 (Okla. 1984); Klempner v. Lemon,
35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 505 (Ohio 1897);
Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1913); Swope v. Holmes,
124 So. 131 (La. 1929); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:122 cmt.
69. Modern conservation statutes and regulations, such as well spacing rules,
setback rules, and compulsory unitization can decrease the frequency of drainage
disputes, but such disputes still can occur. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
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protect against drainage was recognized as early as 1896 in Pennsylvania70
and shortly thereafter in Ohio.71 The traditional way to protect the leased
premises against drainage is to drill offset wells,72 though some courts
have recognized that a lessee may be able to protect against drainage by
seeking pooling or unitization.73 In some cases, spacing rules may prohibit
the drilling of a well that would protect against drainage. In such a case, if
the regulator will grant exceptions to the usual spacing rules, the lessee
may have an obligation to seek such an exception.74 On the other hand,
because a lessee is only required to take reasonable steps to protect against
drainage, the lessee need not drill an offset well if it likely would be
unprofitable to do so.75
In some states, if the lessee of the property being drained happens to
be the operator of the neighboring well that is draining the lessor’s
property, courts may hold the lessee to a higher standard of conduct than
in cases in which the operator of the draining well is someone else, or
courts may shift the burden of proof from the lessor to the lessee to show
the reasonability of the lessee’s conduct.76 But other states do not appear
70. See Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109 (Pa. 1896).
71. See Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 Ohio (1897).
72. See, e.g., Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); see LA. REV.
STAT. § 31:122 cmt.; Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406,
415 (La. Ct. App.) (describing implied covenant to protect against drainage as
being “actually an implied obligation to drill offset wells” when necessary to
prevent drainage), writ denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964). One prominent treatise
states that an offset well is “[a] well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the
drainage of oil or gas to an adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled
or is already in production.” MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at
684.
73. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 821; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Garza Energy Trust Corp., 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 n.57 (Tex. 2008); Southeastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Tichauhek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999); Breaux v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 418 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 165
So. 2d 481 (La. 1964).
74. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981); Spaeth
v. Union Oil Co., 710 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that Oklahoma
law allows the Corporation Commission to authorize exceptions to spacing rules
and stating that “Union had a duty, which it could not ignore, to seek
administrative relief.”).
75. See Garza Energy, 268 S.W.3d at 14 n.42; Breaux, 163 So. 2d at 415 (to
prove a breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage, the lessor must
show that “it would have been economically feasible for the lessee to drill such
offset wells”).
76. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 336-37.
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to apply a heightened standard of conduct or to shift the burden of proof
in such a common-lessee situation.77
5. Covenant to Diligently Market
The implied covenant to market requires a lessee to diligently seek
purchasers at a reasonable price for any oil or gas that is found in paying
quantities.78 Disputes regarding this implied covenant most often involve
natural gas, rather than oil.79 In part, this is because operators have fewer
options for storing natural gas and transporting it to market than they have
for storing and transporting oil. Oil can be shipped via pipeline, or it can
be temporarily stored in tanks located near the well and then periodically
transported to a market via trailer truck, railcar, or barge. In contrast,
pipelines typically are the only practical option for transporting natural gas
to market. Sometimes a connection to a pipeline will be readily available,
but that is not always the case, and building entirely new pipelines or even
long connections to existing pipelines can be expensive and timeconsuming.
The implied covenant to diligently market has at least two
components. The first is a duty to diligently seek a buyer and a pipeline to
transport the gas to the buyer. The second is a duty to seek the best price
reasonably available, though this duty is only triggered if the lease
77. Id. at 416.
78. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 338-39; Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co.,
45 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1899); Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 3 So. 2d 289
(La. 1941).
The implied covenant to market has been the subject of significant case law across
the nation, as well as commentary by nationally prominent oil and gas scholars.
See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Overriding Royalty
Interests and Nonparticipating Royalty Interest, Whether Payable in Value or in
Kind, Be Subject to the Same Valuation Standards as Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1 (2000); John S. Lowe, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation: The
Role of the Implied Covenant to Market, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. SPECIAL INST. ON
PRIVATE OIL & GAS ROYALTIES, Chapter 6 (2003); Jacqueline S. Weaver, When
Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing
Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491 (1997); David E. Pierce, Exploring the
Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST., Ch. 10 (2002); Bruce M. Kramer and Chris Pearson, The
Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil & Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes for the
80’s, 46 LA. L. REV. 788 (1986); Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied
Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW.
LEGAL FDN. OIL & GAS INST. 177 (1976).
79. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 853.
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provides for a royalty that is based on the sales price or the proceeds from
sale.80 If the royalty is based on the market value, the duty to seek the best
price reasonably available would not be triggered because the royalty
owed to the lessor is independent of the price that the leaseholder actually
obtains for the gas, and instead depends only on the market value. In some
states, the marketing covenant has a third component—a duty for the
lessee to absorb all post-production costs unless the lease makes it clear
that the lessee is not solely responsible for those costs.
Traditionally, disputes regarding the implied covenant to market
concerned disagreements between the lessor and lessee regarding the first
component of the marketing covenant, the lessee’s duty to be diligent in
finding a buyer or in making connections to a pipeline so that the gas can
be transported to market.81 Occasionally, disputes arose regarding the
second component of the marketing covenant—the lessee’s duty to seek
the best price reasonably available.
Disputes regarding the first two components of the marketing
covenant still can arise, but another type of “marketing” dispute has often
arisen in recent years. Many leases provide for a royalty to be paid based
on the “value” of gas at the wellhead, but gas often is sold at a market quite
a distance from the well. Further, gas at the wellhead sometimes is not
suitable for immediate placement into a pipeline because the gas may
contain impurities or be at too low a pressure. Operators often will incur
significant expenses in treating the gas to bring its composition to pipeline
specifications and in compressing the gas in order to put it into a pipeline
and transport it to market. These steps cost money, but they also add value
to the gas. And absent these steps, the gas often would not be marketable.
To determine the value of the gas at the wellhead for purposes of
calculating a royalty, operators generally have used a “net-back” or
“workback” method.82 This method assumes that the value of gas at the
wellhead is the price received for the gas when it is sold at market, minus
the post-production (i.e., post-wellhead) costs that the operator incurs
between the wellhead and the place of sale. And, from a standpoint of

80. Union Pacific v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex. 2003); Yzaguirre v.
KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. 2001).
81. Id.
82. “Under this method costs of transportation, processing and treatment are
deducted from the ultimate proceeds of sale of the oil or gas … to ascertain
wellhead value.” See MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 1154.
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economics, this makes sense.83 If sweet,84 dehumidified, high-pressure gas
sells for $5 at a distant market, then sour,85 humid, low-pressure gas at the
wellhead logically is worth $4 if the costs of treatment, dehydration,
compression, and transport equal $1.
But lessors often have argued that the post-production tasks that an
operator performs to gather, treat, dehydrate, and compress gas are all
steps in the marketing of the gas.86 Therefore, their argue continues, unless
the lease expressly states that the lessee may deduct the costs of these steps
prior to calculating the royalty, the implied duty to market requires the
lessee to absorb the costs and to pay royalties on the full sale price of the
gas. Some courts have accepted such an argument,87 while others have
rejected it.88 A rule that lessees are responsible for all post-production
costs, up to the point that the gas becomes marketable, is sometimes called
the first marketable product rule.89
83. See Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (“Basic principles of economics require that, in determining the ‘gross
proceeds at the wellhead’ in the absence of an actual sale of gas at the wellhead
resulting in ascertainable gross proceeds, the gross proceeds from a sale elsewhere
must be extrapolated, backwards or forwards, to reflect appropriate adjustments
due to differences in the location, quality, or characteristics of what is being
sold.”).
84. Sweet gas is natural gas with a relatively low hydrogen sulfide content.
85. Sour gas is natural gas with a relatively high hydrogen sulfide content.
86. For further discussion of such marketing disputes, see David E. Pierce,
Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market,
48 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST., Ch. 10 (2002); David W. Hardymon, Adrift on the
Implied Covenant to Market: Regulation by Implication, 24 ENERGY & MIN. L.
INST. 209 (2003).
87. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 897 (Colo. 2001) (lessor’s
implied covenant argument prevails).
In Oklahoma and Kansas, the implied covenant to market will require the operator
to absorb post-production costs necessary to make natural gas marketable, but if
the composition and pressure of the gas are such that the gas already is marketable,
the lessee may deduct post-production costs for treatment and compression to the
extent such costs are reasonable and add value to the gas. See Mittelstaedt v. Santa
Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998); Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.,
894 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1995).
88. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Pa.
2010) (rejecting lessors’ implied covenant to market argument, in addition to
rejecting their arguments that were based on the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty
Act); Poplar Creek Development Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia LLC, 636 F.3d
235 (6th Cir. 2011) (under Kentucky law, rejecting argument that implied
covenant to market prohibited deduction of post-production costs).
89. MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 383.
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6. Covenant to Restore the Surface
The implied covenant to restore the surface requires the lessee to
restore the leased premises to a condition reasonably approaching its
original condition after the lease terminates, or perhaps after operations
terminate in the area at issue.90 The implied duty of surface restoration is
not widely recognized in jurisprudence, but Arkansas has recognized it,91
and it frequently is discussed in commentary.92 Texas and New Mexico
appear to have rejected such a duty.93 Louisiana also has rejected an
implied covenant of surface restoration—at least for cases in which the
lessee’s conduct that caused the surface impacts was authorized by the
lease and the use of the surface was not “excessive.”94
7. Other Implied Covenants that Might Exist
Some commentators have suggested that other implied covenants
might exist, including covenants to use reasonable care in producing
minerals (for example, to take sufficient care to avoid accidents)95 and to
90. See Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases – Past,
Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 640, 658 (1994).
91. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.,
151 S.W.3d 306, 310-12 (Ark. 2004); Bonds v. Sanchez-O’Brien Oil & Gas Co.,
715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986).
92. See Martin, supra note 90, at 658; Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants:
Claims Under Mineral Code Article 122, pp. 188-90 Proceedings of the 57th
Annual Mineral Law Institute (2010); LA. REV. STAT. 31:122 cmt. The official
comment to Louisiana Mineral Code article 122 suggests that, after the lease ends,
a mineral lessee might have an implied obligation “to restore the surface of the
lease premises as near as is practical to original condition.” Subsequent to
enactment of the Mineral Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court had stated in dicta
that such a duty exists, Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1999),
and lower courts had held that such a duty exists. See, e.g., Edwards v. Jeems
Bayou Production Co., 507 So. 2d 11, 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). But in
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La.
2005), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a general implied obligation to
restore the surfaces does not exist under Louisiana law, at least in circumstances
in which the lessee was authorized by the lease to conduct the activities that it did
and the wear and tear on the property was not excessive.
93. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957);
Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms, 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985).
94. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789
(La. 2005).
95. See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to
Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 SW. LEGAL FDN. OIL &
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properly represent the lessor’s interests before state conservation
agencies.96 These proposed implied covenants have not been recognized
in jurisprudence, but neither have they been rejected, so perhaps a court
would recognize such a duty under appropriate facts.97 But a court might
reject an argument that implied covenants provide the basis for a
contractual claim when accidents occur, and instead hold that a plaintiff’s
claim sounds in tort only. And, in some states, a collateral attack rule might
serve as a barrier to claims that a lessee did not adequately represent the
lessor before regulatory authorities.98
D. Defenses, Remedies, and Other Issues
In some circumstances, lessees will have meritorious defenses to
otherwise valid implied covenant claims. The following subsections of this
Article first discuss some of the defenses that courts have recognized and
then discuss some of the remedies that may be available in the event a
lessor prevails on an implied covenant claim.

GAS INST. 177, 179 (1976). The proposed implied covenant to use reasonable care
likely overlaps with negligence law. See id. at 179-80. Because the lessor would
be able to recover in a tort action, there sometimes would be no reason for a court
to determine whether a contractual duty was breached, though in some situations
it might be necessary to reach that issue, as when the applicable limitations period
depends on whether a plaintiff’s claim sounds in contract or tort.
96. Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases ─ Past,
Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 660-1 (1994); see John M. McCollam,
Impact of Louisiana Mineral Code on Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases, 22 MIN. LAW
INST. 37, 68-9 (1975) (referring to a “possibly emerging obligation to represent
the lessor’s interest fairly before regulatory agencies such as the Louisiana
Commissioner of Conservation,” but stating “it is probably not correct to
characterize this as a recognized implied obligation in Louisiana”).
Professor John Lowe states that common implied covenants include the duties to
test, develop, explore, protect, and market. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 313. He
also mentions an implied covenant of diligent and prudent operation, though he
notes that it largely overlaps other implied covenants. See id. at 348.
97. Courts have recognized, at least in dicta, that a lessee might be able to
satisfy its duty to protect against drainage by appropriately seeking unitization.
See Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 415 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964). Breaux also suggested that a lessee’s
failure to seek unitization possibly could be a basis for liability. See 163 So. 2d at
415. But few other cases suggest this possibility. See also McCollam, supra note
96 at 68-9, 77-8.
98. See, e.g., Trahan v. The Superior Oil Co., 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983).
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1. Precluding Implied Covenants by Expressly Addressing Subject
Courts will not impose an implied covenant that is expressly negated
by the lease itself.99 Further, if a lease expressly imposes a duty of the same
type that would be imposed by an implied covenant, courts generally will
conclude that the parties intended the express duty to be the full extent of
the lessee’s obligation with respect to that type of performance. Thus, even
if the lease does not explicitly state that the express duty describes the full
extent of the lessee’s obligation or that the lessee is not bound by an
implied covenant, courts usually will reach that result. In other words, a
duty expressly imposed by the lease will generally not be supplemented
by an implied covenant.100 The express duty implicitly negates any implied
duty for the same variety of performance.
The most common lease clause that negates an implied covenant is the
delay-rental clause, which negates the implied covenant to drill a test well.
Delay rental clauses generally are an example of implicit negation of an
implied covenant. Delay rental clauses generally either impose a duty to
drill or pay delay rentals within the first year (in an “or” clause) or state
that the lease will terminate unless the lessee drills or pays delay rentals
within the first year (in an “unless” clause”),101 but delay rental clauses
generally do not state explicitly that the implied covenant to drill a test
well is negated.
Express lease clauses also can be used to negate other implied
covenants. For example, in Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi, the Texas
Supreme Court held that an express lease clause negated the existence of
an implied covenant to reasonably develop.102 The case involved two
leases. One required drilling a well every sixty days after discovery of oil
until a total of twelve wells were drilled. The second lease required drilling
a well every ninety days until four wells were drilled. The lessee complied
with those terms, but the lessor argued that the lessee had breached an
implied covenant of reasonable development because a reasonably prudent
99. Kachelmacher v. Laird, 110 N.E. 933, 935 (Ohio 1915).
100. See Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 44 A. 555, 556 (Pa. 1888) (“where the
parties have expressly agreed on what shall be done, there is no room for the
implication of anything not so stipulated for”); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E.
502, 505 (Ohio 1897) (“The implied covenant arises only when the lease is silent
on the subject.”); Lundin/Weber Company LLC v. Brea Oil Company, Inc., 11
Cal Rptr. 3d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.
2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
101. See LOWE, supra note 25 at 204-06 (discussing “or” clauses and “unless”
clauses).
102. 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. 1937).
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operator would drill several more wells than the lessee had drilled. A jury
granted a verdict to the lessor, but the appellate court reversed, and the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court judgment, holding that
the existence of an express clause imposing certain duties to develop
precluded the existence of an implied covenant to reasonably develop. 103
Thus, the express duty implicitly negated an implied covenant of
reasonable development.
In Lundin/Weber Company LLC v. Brea Oil Company, Inc., a
California court held that express drilling duties stated in a lease negated
any implied covenant of further exploration.104 Two leases were at issue.105
The first lease stated that the lessee would drill ten wells each year for the
first four years of the lease, and that each well would be drilled to a depth
of at least 1,000 feet, unless oil was discovered in paying quantities at a
shallower depth.106 The second lease provided that, once the lessee
commenced drilling operations, it would “prosecute the drilling of a well
or wells with reasonable diligence until oil or gas . . . is found in quantities
deemed paying.”107 The lease discussed the lessee’s duty to execute partial
releases of the lease and required the lessee to “reasonably develop the
acreage retained” after oil or gas was discovered in paying quantities, but
the lease also stated that the lessee would “in no event be required to drill
more than one well per ten” acres of area capable of producing oil or 160
acres of area capable of producing gas.108
The lessor argued that the lessee breached a duty of further exploration
by not drilling more wells to a depth of 3,000 feet.109 The court rejected that
argument and concluded that the terms of the two leases expressly imposed
a duty of exploration that existed up until the time oil or gas was found in
paying quantities, after which an expressly delimited duty of reasonable
development existed. Given that the leases expressly imposed duties of
exploration that existed up until oil or gas was found in paying quantities,
the court would not impose an implied duty of further exploration for the
period after oil or gas was discovered in paying quantities.110
103. Id.
104. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Because the court determined
that the express lease terms would negate an implied covenant, the court did not
reach the issue of whether California would recognize an implied covenant of
further exploration.
105. See id. at 769.
106. See id. at 772-3.
107. See id. at 774.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 770.
110. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 774-75.
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In Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., a Michigan court concluded that the
express terms of a lease precluded an argument that an implied covenant to
market barred use of the “work back” method to calculate royalties.111 The
lease stated royalties would be a specified fraction of “gross proceeds at the
wellhead” or “the prevailing market rate at the wellhead.”112 The lessor
argued that an implied covenant to market required the lessee to absorb postproduction costs.113 The court disagreed. The court stated that, assuming
Michigan recognized an implied covenant to market,114 the covenant would
not apply whenever the lease expressly addresses a subject.115 The court
reasoned that the royalty clause expressly addressed how royalties should
be calculated, and that the lease’s “at the wellhead” language should be
interpreted as allowing use of the work back method whenever gas is sold
at a distance from the well, rather than at the wellhead.116
As for the duty to protect against drainage, numerous cases deal with
the effect of a lease clause that expressly imposes duties to drill offset
wells.117 Most of the clauses require the lessee to drill an offset well if a
productive well is located on nearby land, within a specified distance of
the leased premises. Such a clause might expressly require the lessee to
drill an offset well if a productive well is located within 150 feet of the
leased premises.118 But such clauses typically do not expressly address
whether the lessee has any duty to drill an offset well if a well on nearby
property is located further than the specified distance. This leads to the
question of whether the lessee is bound by both the express covenant and
an implied covenant to protect against drainage, or whether the express
covenant precludes the existence of an implied covenant. If the logic of
the three cases noted above—Kishi, Lundin/Weber, and Schroeder—
applies in the context of an express offset well covenant, such an express
covenant would preclude the existence of an implied covenant to protect
against drainage. And that is the result a Texas appellate court reached in
Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.119
111. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
112. See id. at 890.
113. See id. at 891.
114. The court did not reach the issue of whether such a duty exists under
Michigan law. See id. at 895-96.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 894.
117. See generally, discussion at MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3.
118. See, e.g., Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 174 (5th
Cir. 1970).
119. 161 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App. 1942). Other Texas cases have
suggested that the express offset clause only applies during the primary term,
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But in other cases, courts have reached contrary results, particularly if
the lessee that is accused of breaching an implied covenant to protect
against drainage is also the operator of the draining well on the
neighboring property. For example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, the
Texas Supreme Court held that, if a leased premises is being drained, an
express offset well covenant will not preclude the existence of an implied
covenant to protect against drainage if the lessee is the operator of the
draining well on the neighboring property.120 In Stansbury, the Court
expressly rejected Hutchins to the extent that Hutchins suggested that an
express offset clause would preclude a lessor’s implied covenant claim
against his lessee if the lessee also was the operator of the draining well.
Similarly, a California appellate court concluded that an express offset
well would not preclude the existence of an implied covenant to protect
against drainage if the lessee of the premises being drained was also the
operator of the draining well on the neighboring tract.121 In Williams v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., the United States Fifth Circuit concluded that
this would also be the result under Louisiana law.122 Similarly, in Millette
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that
an express offset well covenant would preclude an implied covenant to
protect against drainage, but that if the lessee was the operator of the
draining well, the lessee would be liable for breach of an implied covenant
that he do nothing to impair the value of the lease.123
Further, in certain cases, particularly when offset well covenants are
triggered only by wells that are closer to the leased premises than would
generally be allowed under spacing rules, some courts and commentators
seem to believe it would be unfair to allow such a clause to implicitly
negate an implied covenant to protect against drainage.124 They reason that
a prospective lessor who reads a proposed lease containing such a clause
might understand the clause as imposing an extra duty on the lessee, when
the primary effect, assuming the express clause is allowed to implicitly
negate any implied covenant to protect, actually will be to decrease the
though it is not clear why this would be so. See also Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. App. 1957); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691, 693
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
120. 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1967).
121. R.R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 158 P.2d 754 (Cal. App.
158 P.2d 754 (Cal. App. 1945).
122. 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
123. 48 So. 2d 344 (Miss. 1950). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette,
72 So. 2d 176 (Miss. 1954).
124. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3; see also Williams v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 174 (5th Cir. 1970).
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lessee’s duties.125 Those authorities believe that an implied covenant to
protect against drainage should co-exist with the express duty, assuming
the lease does not explicitly negate an implied obligation.
Relatively few leases expressly negate the existence of an implied
covenant to protect against drainage, but courts and commentators have
stated that, whenever the parties have agreed to a clause that expressly
negates or limits an implied covenant to protect against drainage, the
clause should be enforced.126
2. Demand and Opportunity to Cure
Before filing suit based on an alleged breach of an implied covenant,
a lessor sometimes must give the lessee a notice of the alleged breach and
a reasonable time to cure the breach. In Louisiana, for example, the
Mineral Code requires a lessor to provide the lessee with written notice of
an alleged breach, and a reasonable opportunity to cure it, before filing a
suit based either on drainage or the lessee’s alleged failure to develop and
operate the leased premises as a prudent operator.127
In most other jurisdictions, case law makes notice and a reasonable
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a suit seeking an order terminating the
lease as a remedy for a breach of implied covenants.128 Those jurisdictions
125. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3.
126. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623, 630 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Beaumont 1966), writ refused n.r.e., 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1966) (“A
lessor and lessee may contract so that a lessee is never under obligation to drill an
offset well. To so contract, however, the language must be very clear.”); MARTIN
& KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 826.3 (“No one would object to enforcing a clause
that stated that lessee is not obligated to offset wells more than 150 feet from
boundary lines.”); Linn v. Wehrle, 35 Ohio App. 107, 109, 172 N.E. 288, 289 (5th
Dist. 1928).
127. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:136; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 31:135 & cmt.
Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that Mineral Code article 136 does
not require the lessor to provide notice and an opportunity to cure as a perquisite
to a suit seeking restoration of the land.
128. See e.g., Smith v. Tull, 43 P.2d 84, 85 (Okla. 1935); Hayes v. Equitable
Energy Resources Co., 266 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Kentucky law).
Arkansas courts do not make notice and an opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a
suit for lease cancellation. See Davis v. Ross Production Co., 910 S.W. 2d 209,
212-13 (Ark. 1995). But the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated, if a lessor does
not give pre-suit notice and an opportunity to cure, a conditional order of
cancellation, giving the lessee an opportunity to cure, is preferable to an order of
outright lease cancellation. See Roberson Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller Land and
Lumber Co., 700 S.W. 2d 57, 58 (Ark. 1985).
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do not necessarily make notice and opportunity to cure a prerequisite to an
action for damages, but lease termination is such a commonly-sought
remedy for alleged breaches of implied covenants that notice and an
opportunity to cure effectively become a prerequisite in most implied
covenant cases. The rationale for requiring notice and an opportunity to
cure as a prerequisite for the remedy of lease termination is that such
termination can be a harsh remedy. Further, unless the lease itself
expressly provides for termination in the event of a breach, termination is
an equitable remedy,129 rather than a legal remedy, and equity “abhors a
forfeiture.”130 Moreover, if a person seeks equity, that person must act
equitably, and it is fair for the lessor to give the lessee an opportunity to
cure a breach before seeking lease termination.
Depending on the language of the particular lease, a requirement that
the lessor give notice and an opportunity may be a prerequisite to any suit
by the lessor that is based on an alleged breach of express or implied terms
of the lease, or the clause may make it a prerequisite only for certain types
of claims or claims seeking certain types of relief, such as lease
termination. If the lease requires notice and an opportunity to cure, the
lessor typically must demand that the lessee cure the alleged breach. If the
lessor sends the lessee a letter that simply inquires about a matter, or the
lessor sends a notice asserting that the lease has terminated because of an
alleged breach, such a communication probably will not satisfy the
requirement for notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure.131
Finally, it should be noted that some leases contain a judicial
ascertainment clause. Such clauses typically provide that a lease cannot be
terminated as a remedy for a breach of an implied covenant until the lessee
has been given a reasonable opportunity to cure after a court determines
that the lessee was in breach of an implied covenant. In the absence of such
a clause, lessees sometimes can find themselves in a difficult situation.
Suppose the lessor alleges a breach of an implied covenant to reasonably
develop and demands that the lessee cure the alleged breach by drilling
one or more wells, which will be very expensive. Further, suppose that
129. ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex.
2010); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 39 P.3d 577, 583 (Idaho 2001); Columbus Hotel
Co. v. Pierce, 692 So. 2d 605, 609-10 (Miss. 1993); Ionno v. Glen-Gery Corp.,
443 N.E.2d 504, 509 (Ohio 1983).
130. See, e.g., Fisher v. Heirs and Devisees of T.D. Lovercheck, 864 N.W.2d
212, 217 (Neb. 2015); Wagner & Brown Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 429
(Tex. 2008); Columbus Hotel Co. v. Pierce, 629 So. 2d 605, 609 (Miss. 1993);
Thurner v. Kaufman, 699 P.2d 435, 438 (Kan. 1985) (referring to “the oftrepeated maxim that ‘equity abhors a forfeiture’”).
131. See Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W. 2d 784, 788 (N.D. 1996).
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there exists a good faith disagreement regarding whether the lessee has
breached an implied covenant, but the lease is valuable, and the lessee does
not want to risk litigation because, if it loses the litigation, the court may
award lease termination. A judicial ascertainment clause can save the
lessee from that dilemma by giving it the option to defend a suit alleging
a breach of an implied covenant without risking losing the lease.132
3. The Effect of a Lessor’s Unsuccessful Suit Seeking Lease
Cancellation
Some courts have held that a lessee’s duty to perform is suspended
pending resolution of the lessor’s allegation that the lease has terminated.133
Such a rule sometimes is called the repudiation doctrine. The doctrine is
based on fairness and equity. A lessee should not be expected to spend
money on drilling additional wells at the same time that the lessor is seeking
a court ruling that the lease has terminated.134 Accordingly, if the lessor fails
to obtain lease termination based on his original complaint, the lessor should
not then be allowed to pursue an argument that the lease should be
terminated based on the fact that the lessee was not drilling additional wells
while the lessor’s original complaint was pending. The repudiation doctrine
is widely recognized, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected
it.135
132. For a thorough discussion of judicial ascertainment clauses, see PATRICK
H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, 5 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW, §§
682-682.5.
133. See e.g., Coasted Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1,
20 (Tex. 2008); Lewis v. Kansas Production Co., Inc., 199 P. 3d 180, 187 (Kan.
App. 2009).
134. If a lease already has terminated, or if it never was valid, then the putative
lessee is at substantial risk if he drills more wells. He will be required to account
to the lessor for all production. Further, even if the well is successful and he has
to turn the well over to the plaintiff, the putative lessee might not be entitled to
reimbursement for his drilling costs. And if the putative lessee drills a dry hole,
he might even be liable for damages for having reduced the leasing value of the
property by drilling a well that shows the property is not a good prospect for
mineral production. Greer v. Carter Oil, 25 N.E.2d 805, 810-11 (Ill. 1940) (noting
the possibility of a damages claim for reduced value of property for mineral
leasing if a company that lacks an enforceable lease drills a dry hole), cf. Layne
Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So. 2d 20, 22 (1946)
(upholding damage for land’s reduced value for mineral leasing after a company
conducted seismic operations without authority and those operations showed the
land was a poor candidate for drilling).
135. Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 110 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2015).
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4. Issues of Law vs. Fact and the Burden of Proof
The question of whether a particular implied covenant exists generally
will be a matter of law.136 The question of whether a lessee has breached
an implied covenant is an issue of fact.137 The lessor generally has the
burden of proving that the lessee had breached an implied obligation of
the lease.138 Nevertheless, some courts have suggested that the burden of
proof might be placed on the lessee to show the reasonability of his
conduct if he is accused of breaching the implied covenant to protect
against drainage and the lessee happens to be the operator of the well on
neighboring property that is draining the leased premises.139

136. See, e.g., Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So.
2d 789 (La. 2005) (discussing whether an implied obligation to restore surface
exists as a matter of Louisiana law).
137. See Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948);
Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers’ Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 717, 64 So 684, 690
(1914).
138. Whitham Farms LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 138-39 (Colo.
App. 2003); Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated, 201 La. 99, 105, 9 So.
2d 473, 475-76 (1942) (lessor has burden of proving a breach of the implied
obligation to protect against drainage); Saulters v. Sklar, 158 So. 2d 460, 463 (La.
App. 2nd Cir. 1963) (lessor plaintiff had burden of proving lessee had not
reasonably developed the premises).
139. See LOWE, supra note 25, at 336-37.
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5. Remedies Available
The potential remedies available for breach of an implied covenant
include: (1) monetary damages;140 (2) conditional cancellation;141 (3)
partial cancellation;142 (4) complete cancellation;143 and (5) specific
140. Clovis v. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 345 P.2d 729, 731 (Colo.
1959); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio, 1897). Damages awards
are not common in implied covenants cases because it often is difficult to prove
the amount of damages. See Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368,
371372 (W. Va. 1913) (referring to “the impossibility of adequate proof of the
extent” of injury); see also Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d
406, 414-16 (La. App.), writ denied, (La. 1964); LA. REV. STAT. 31:136 (referring
to the possibility of a damages award); Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
432 F.2d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 1526 (1971). See also
Coasted Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 18-19 (Tex. 2008)
(discussing in dicta what would be the appropriate measure of monetary damages
for a breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage).
See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex.
2008) (citing cases and discussing three possible measures of damages for breach
of the implied covenant to protect against drainage).
141. When a court awards conditional cancellation, it orders that the lease will
be cancelled (in whole or part) unless the lessee renders a particular performance
within a stated time. See, e.g., Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); see
Roberson Enters. v. Miller Land Lumber Co., 700 S.W. 2d 57, 58 (Ark. 1985)
(referring to conditional cancellation as a possible remedy); Stubbs v. Imperial
Oil & Gas Co., 164 La. 689, 695, 114 So. 595 (1927); Cutrer v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 202 F. Supp 568, 572-73 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 309 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 83 S. Ct. 883 (1963).
142. Often, if a lessee has one or more productive wells, but it has not
reasonably developed or adequately explored the remainder of the leased
premises, a court may allow the lessee to retain the lease as to some modest
acreage around each productive well, while ordering lease cancellation as to the
remainder of the leased premises. See, e.g., Robinson v. Miracle, 293 P. 211
(Okla. 1930); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896) (court orders a
conditional, partial cancellation); LA. REV. STAT. § 30:142; Eota Realty Co. v.
Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74 So. 2d 30 (1954) (lessee’s failure to develop part
of leased premises only justified cancellation of lease as to the portion that had
not yet been developed); see also Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 237 La. 1015,
1030-1, 112 So. 2d 695, 701 (1959) (awarding partial cancellation).
143. See Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 372 (W. Va. 1913).
Complete cancellation is considered a harsh remedy, but it sometimes is granted.
For a case noting that cancellation is a harsh remedy, see St. Luke’s United
Methodist Church v. CNG Development Co., 663 S.E.2d 639, 644 (W. Va. 2008);
see also Robbins V. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Kan. 1990) (“As
a general rule, forfeiture of oil and gas lease for breach of an implied covenant is
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performance.144 The most common remedies probably are the various
forms of lease cancellation—total, partial, and conditional. Lease
cancellation can be harsh, and generally it is disfavored, but it sometimes
is the most practical remedy. Further, if notice and cure are required, this
somewhat mitigates the harshness of cancellation, particularly if
conditional cancellation is used in circumstances where the lessee had a
good faith argument that it was not in breach. A damages award would be
preferable to lease cancellation, but it is often difficult or impossible to
quantify the damages that result from the breach of an implied covenant.
And courts generally are unwilling to order specific performance of tasks
as complex as those involved in complying with implied covenants.
In an interesting, recent development, a few cases from Ohio have
issued rulings holding either that an oil and gas lease is not subject to
partial abandonment by depth or that that partial termination by depth is
not a permissible remedy for an alleged breach of an implied covenant.145
On the other hand, courts in other jurisdictions have been willing to
order, or at least consider, partial terminations by depth. For example, in a
1962 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that
granted a termination of a lease as to certain depths for 120 of the 160
acres covered by a lease.146 Because only the lessor appealed the lower
disfavored.”); LA. REV. STAT. § 31:142 (stating in part that, “A mineral lease may
be dissolved partially or in its entirety.”).
144. Courts generally are unwilling to order specific performance unless the
performance required is can be commanded in a straightforward order, such as an
order to deliver property. Given that a lessee’s duties under implied covenants
involve more complex obligations, such as an obligation to drill a well, an order
of specific performance rarely will be appropriate as a form of remedy for breach
of an implied covenant. See LA. REV. STAT. 31:134 cmt. (stating that specific
performance may be awarded in appropriate circumstances, but also stating that
“[m]andatory injunctions may be unavailable in some instances, such as a request
that a lessee be compelled to drill a well”).
145. Beer v. Griffith, 399 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ohio 1980). See also Cable v.
Cubbon, 5 Ohio Law Abs., 1926 WL 2884 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 1926);
Hartline v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties, Inc., 2017 WL 1014377 (S.D. Ohio
2017) (forfeiture was not an available remedy for alleged breach of oil and gas
lease because lease provided for forfeiture in some circumstances, but did not
expressly provide for forfeiture for the type of breach alleged, and lessors did not
assert that damages would be an inadequate remedy; note that court seemed to
erroneously refer to termination of lease upon certain conditions as a forfeiture,
as opposed to a termination of a lease by its own terms).
146. Barnes v. Mack Oil Co., 376 P.2d 279, 280 (Okla. 1962). In prior
decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had declined to order partial termination
based on depth, but had suggested that such relief could be granted under
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court judgment, the decision demonstrates only that a lessee’s breach of
implied covenant duties as to certain depths does not entitle the lessee to a
cancellation of the lease as to all depths. The case does not authoritatively
establish that lessees have no basis to complain about partial terminations
by depth. But nothing in the decision suggests that the court thought that
a partial termination by depth was inappropriate.
E. Is There an Implied Covenant to Use New Technology?
The technology used in oil and gas exploration and development
evolves continuously. In 1859, Edwin Drake drilled the first oil well in the
United States. He chose the drill site based on the proximity of natural
seeps, and he used a cable tool rig to drill. He found oil at a depth of about
69½ feet. His workers were a blacksmith, whom Drake hired because the
blacksmith had experience making tools for persons who drilled water
wells, and the blacksmith’s sons.147
Today, companies use high-speed computers to process complex
seismic data in order to create three-dimensional maps of subsurface
geology. Companies can begin drilling vertically, and then turn the
direction of drilling to proceed diagonally or even horizontally. They often
drill to depths tens of thousands of feet beneath the surface and drill on the
outer continental shelf, sometimes in water that is a mile deep. They can
fracture formations that have low permeability in order to release oil or
gas found in the pore spaces of such formations, and they also can use
sophisticated secondary and tertiary recovery techniques in order to
produce more oil than could be produced using only primary recovery.
The technology is very sophisticated, and workers are often well-trained
and experienced.
Such technology can increase the likelihood of finding oil or gas,
increase the total ultimate recovery from a reservoir, increase the rate of
recovery, and make it economical to drill in circumstances in which
drilling otherwise would not be economical. This raises a question: Are
lessees bound by an implied covenant to use new technology as it is
developed?
If the question is taken literally, the correct answer clearly is, “No.” A
lessee does not have a duty to use new technology for the sake of using
new technology. Accordingly, there is no “implied covenant to use new
technology.” But new technology can help a lessee operate more
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., McKenna v. Nichlos, 145 P.2d 957, 960
(Okla. 1944).
147. Daniel Yergin, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND
POWER 27 (1991).
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effectively. Thus, a lessee who does not use new technology might not
perform as effectively as operators who use newer technology. Further,
implied covenants require a lessee to perform certain functions to the same
extent that a reasonably prudent operator would. Accordingly, a better
question might be whether there can be circumstances in which an operator
who performs as effectively as reasonably can be expected using the
technology that existed at the time the lease was executed can be liable for
a breach of one of the traditional implied covenants if the use of newer
technology would allow such an operator to perform better. This issue has
not been addressed extensively in jurisprudence or commentary, but the
answer seems to be that an operator can be liable in such circumstances.
Two of the leading cases on this issue are from Louisiana. In Wadkins
v. Wilson Oil Co., the plaintiffs granted a mineral lease that covered forty
acres of land.148 For the first several years after the plaintiffs granted the
lease to the defendant in 1923, the defendant operated as diligently as other
operators who held leases in the same general area. The plaintiffs’ land
contained two existing wells. The defendant produced oil from those two
wells until the wells quit producing. The operator then plugged the two
wells back to a shallower chalk formation, re-perforated both wells, and
successfully put one of the two wells back into production. The defendant
also drilled four additional productive wells into the same chalk formation
on the leased premises, so that there were five producing wells on the forty
acres.
The five wells were still producing oil in 1941, but their rates of
production had decreased. Other operators in the same general area were
getting much higher production rates from the same chalk formation by
drilling new wells and acidizing them.149 Experience in the area had shown
that acidizing did not work as effectively on existing wells as on new
wells, so it was necessary to drill new wells to get the full benefit of
acidizing. The plaintiffs demanded that the defendant drill new wells, but
the defendant declined to do so. The plaintiff sued for lease cancellation

148. Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720 (La. 1942).
149. “Acidizing” has been defined as “a well stimulation technique used
primarily on limestone reservoirs. Acid is poured or pumped down the well to
dissolve the limestone and increase fluid flow.” See NORMAN J. HYNE,
NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, DRILLING, AND
PRODUCTION at p. 452 (2nd ed. 2001). “Well stimulation” is “an engineering
method used to increase the permeability of a reservoir around the wellbore to
increase production. It includes acidizing and hydraulic fracturing.” See NORMAN
J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION,
DRILLING AND PRODUCTION at p. 546 (2nd ed. 2001).
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and obtained such an order from the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed, stating:
It is our opinion that the trial judge, under the evidence, correctly
held that the defendant had failed to fulfill its implied obligation
and covenant to further develop the property by drilling new wells
with the modern process which had proved so successful on other
leased properties adjoining and in the vicinity of the property in
question.150
A somewhat analogous fact pattern was presented by Waseco Chemical &
Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp.151 Waseco concerned a 1934 lease
that covered eighty acres in the Bellevue Field in Bossier Parish. The field
contained a shallow sand—at about 350 to 500 feet below the surface—
that contained a heavy, viscous oil. That reservoir had little pressure and
little tendency for gas drive or water drive. Operators tended to produce
oil from the formation at low rates, from densely-spaced wells (about one
per acre) that could be drilled inexpensively in about twelve hours. Bayou
State acquired the lease at issue, the Scanland lease, in the early 1950s. At
that time, about fifty wells had been drilled on the eighty-acre lease tract.
Most of the wells were producing, with total production being about fortysix barrels per day. Over the next twenty-four years, Bayou State did not
drill any more wells on the leased premises or make any capital
expenditures, and by 1976, about nine wells on the property still were
producing, at a cumulative rate of about six barrels per day.
Other operators in the area were doing somewhat better. In 1963,
Getty had begun using fireflood152 operations in the Bellevue Field and
had dramatically increased rates of production. Initially, Getty’s fireflood
project was just a pilot project, but within a few years it was evident that
150. See Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720 at 724.
151. Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d
305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
152. “Fireflooding” is a method for recovering high-viscosity oil that would
be difficult or impossible to recover by other means. In this method, the operator
ignites the oil in a portion of the formation where it is found. The heat from this
“in-situ combustion” causes the oil near the fire to break down into lighter, less
viscous compounds. The less viscous compounds will flow more easily and
therefore can be recovered more easily. This process also creates coke. The coke
burns, creating more heat. The “combustion front” advances, helping to cause a
similar breakdown of the viscous oil in portions of the formation further from the
initial point of combustion. The operator injects air into the formation to supply
the oxygen needed to keep the fire alive. MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra
note 35, at 508.1 (definition of “in situ combustion”).
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the project was successful, and Getty began expanding its fireflood
operations rapidly. Cities Service began extensive use of fireflood
operations in the area, starting in 1971. Bayou State itself used a fireflood
operation on a different lease tract in 1970, but did not perform such
operations on the Scanland lease. Evidence showed that fireflooding could
significantly increase total recovery. With the use of fireflooding,
operators could recover about 60% of the heavy oil in place, compared to
recovery of about 5% when they did not use fireflooding. Fireflooding also
significantly increased the rate of production. Lessors could expect about
$1200 per acre per month in royalties when fireflood operations were used,
compared to about $3 per acre per month when fireflooding was not used.
The lessors brought suit against Bayou State, seeking lease cancellation.
The trial court granted an order of lease cancellation, citing Wadkins, and
the Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed.153
Courts in other states have reached similar conclusions. In Rhoads
Drilling Co. v. Allred, a Texas appellate court concluded that, after an oil
well quit flowing, the operator was obligated to install a pump if doing so
reasonably could be expected to yield a profit.154
In Utilities Production Corporation v. Carter Oil Co., the issue
actually in dispute was somewhat different—whether the lessee had a right
to use natural gas produced from the lease for repressuring operations.155
The lessor argued that the lessee did not because such operations were not
widely known at the time the parties entered the lease. The court rejected
that argument, stating that oil and gas methods continually evolve and that
the parties must have anticipated that new techniques would be developed
and used during the life of the lease. The court added, “In fact, the lessor
would doubtless have just cause to complain if an inefficient operation of
the leases resulted from the failure of the lessees to use improved methods
which came in common use during the terms of the leases.”156
Courts in other states have suggested in dicta that implied covenants
might require a lessee to use advanced recovery techniques. For example,
in In re Shailer’s Estate, the owner of a life estate and the remainderman
disputed the right to proceeds from secondary recovery operations.157 In
deciding that issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted in dicta, with
apparent approval: “There is respectable authority to the effect that there
is an implied covenant in oil and gas leases that a lessee should resort to a
secondary recovery method shown to be practical and presumably
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

371 So. 2d at 313.
Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1934).
Utilities Production Corp. v. Carter Oil Co., 72 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1934).
Id. at 659.
In re Shailer’s Estate, 266 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1954).
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profitable as a means of getting additional return from the lease.”158 An
Illinois appellate court stated that, “It is an implied right and duty of a
reasonably prudent operator under an oil and gas lease to adopt a system
providing for the secondary recovery of oil.”159 Thus, to the extent that
courts have addressed the issue, they have concluded that a lessee
sometimes will have to use new technology in order to satisfy one of the
traditional implied covenants.
Commentators have likewise concluded that the implied covenants
require a lessee to utilize advances in technology to the extent that a
reasonably prudent operator would do so.160 One classic authority on
implied covenants stated that, “The obligation to adopt new and improved
methods of development and operation as their practicability and
superiority become obvious is manifest.”161 The authors of a more recent
paper stated:
That is, to determine whether a lessee is required to drill a well
under the reasonable development covenant or the drainage
covenant, the basic question to be answered is whether a similarlysituated, reasonably prudent operator would drill the well. As
technology changes, the prudent operator standard changes with
technology. If it can be established that other operators use 3-D
seismic techniques, or use satellite imagery, or use horizontal
drilling, there can be little doubt that a lessee, to meet the prudent
operator standard, will be required to use the same technology to
meet its obligation to develop the premises, to explore the
premises, or to protect the premises.162

158. Id. at 616-17.
159. Bi-County Properties v. Wampler, 378 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ill. Ct. App.
1978); see also Reed v. Texas Co., 159 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ill. Ct. App. 1959).
160. Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of
Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 689-90 (1994) (suggesting that the
prudent operator standard can be used to determine whether the lessee is required
to “use new processes developed in the industry); see also Gloria L. Scott,
Development Obligations of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 13 ST. MARY’S L.J. 846, 865
(1982) (“The implied obligation to maximize recovery, for example, may require
the lessee to use modern production techniques.”).
161. Maurice H. Merrill, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES, § 225 (1940).
162. Taylor Reid and John W. Morrison, Doing the Lateral Lambada:
Negotiating the Technical and Legal Challenges of Horizontal Drilling, 43rd
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., Paper No. 16 (1997).
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There has been relatively little commentary regarding which implied
covenant is at issue if an operator’s failure to use new technology causes
him to produce less oil or gas than a reasonably prudent operator would
produce. One commentator suggested that secondary recovery and
stimulation processes applied to existing wells might not be part of the
duty to develop, but that doing such things could fit within “the implied
covenant to manage and administer the lease, which includes a duty to use
modern methods of production.”163 But another oil and gas scholar
discussed the potential obligation to use new technology as potentially
coming under the development obligation.164 Perhaps more important than
the commentators’ possible disagreement regarding which implied
covenant is at issue is their apparent agreement that a lessee who performs
poorly because he fails to use new technology can be liable for breach of
some type of implied covenant.165 It seems clear, then, that, if a lessee’s
failure to use new technology results in his failure to develop, explore,
protect, or market to the extent that a reasonably prudent operator would
do so, the lessee should be liable for breach of an implied covenant. This
seems true under any of the major theoretical justifications for implied
covenants.
For example, consider the implied-intent justification. This theory
provides that parties to leases do not specify a lessee’s duties in detail
163. Laura H. Burney and Norman J. Hyne, Hydraulic Fracturing:
Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing, 44TH ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., Paper 19
(1998). A prominent treatise similarly discusses a lessee’s failure to use “modern
production techniques” under a section of the treatise that examines an implied
covenant to conduct operations with reasonable care and diligence. See MARTIN
& KRAMER, supra note 4, at § 861.3.
164. Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil & Gas Leases – Past, Present
& Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 648-9 (1994).
165. When the lessor’s complaint is that the lessee did not produce oil or gas
from a proven formation as quickly as he should or that he did not obtain as large
an ultimate recovery he should, the author of this paper suggests that the alleged
breach relates to the implied covenant of reasonable development. The classic
description of the implied covenant of reasonable development states that the
covenant requires a lessee to drill as many wells as reasonably necessary to
develop a proven formation. An alleged duty to use acidizing, fireflooding, or
some other technology might not seem to fit within this description. But one could
argue that the classic description refers to drilling as man wells as is reasonably
necessary because the classic way to further develop the premises is to drill more
wells. If a reasonably prudent operator would further develop a proven formation
by using well stimulation, secondary recovery, or some other technology, there
seems little reason why a duty to do that cannot be considered part of the covenant
of reasonable development.
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because they lack sufficient information at the time of lease execution to
specify exactly what the lessee should do, but the parties’ implied intent is
that the operator will act as a reasonably prudent operator. Under this
explanation, implied covenants are an application of the parties’ implied
intent. Assuming that the parties implicitly expected a lessee to drill as
many wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill for the purposes
of developing proven formations, to explore unproven areas to the extent
that a prudent operator would, to protect the leased premises against
drainage to the same extent that a reasonably prudent operator would, and
to market product as diligently as a prudent operator would, there seems
no reason to believe that they would not also expect an operator to use new
technology that a reasonably prudent operator would use.
Another explanation for implied covenants is that courts impose such
covenants to promote fairness, driven in part by the fact that the nature of
oil and gas leasing results in leases that do not have many explicit
protections for lessors. This explanation leads to a similar conclusion
regarding a lessee’s duty to use new technology. In the same way that the
parties lack sufficient information at the time of contracting to specify how
many wells an operator should drill, they also lack information to specify
what techniques an operator should use. This is particularly true given that
leases can last for decades, spanning time during which technology
advances significantly. If a particular operator recovers less product than
a reasonably prudent operator would recover because the particular
operator fails to use new technology that reasonably prudent operators are
using, that seems just as unfair to a lessor as when a particular operator
recovers less product because he drills fewer wells than a reasonably
prudent operator would drill.
Finally, commentators occasionally cite public policy as a reason for
courts to impose implied covenants. If public policy favors production of
oil and gas, and a particular operator produces less oil or gas than a
reasonably prudent operator would produce, the public policy that favors
production seems equally offended whether the shortfall in production is
a result of drilling fewer wells or failing to use new technology.
Thus, the logic behind implied covenants, as well as the existing
jurisprudence and commentary, all suggest that a lessee can breach his
implied obligations if his failure to use new technology causes his
performance to be substandard relative to that of a reasonably prudent
operator. Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that a lessee, as a practical
matter, sometimes will have a duty to use new technology. An operator
will not have an obligation to use technology as soon as it becomes
available or is proven. Courts should be cautious in reaching a conclusion
that a particular lessee has breached an implied covenant. Even if every
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operator that exists was reasonably diligent, they would not all begin using
new technology simultaneously. Some operator inevitably will be the first
to implement new technology, and some operator inevitably will be the
last. The mere fact that an operator has not yet started using technology
that some other operators are using should not be a basis to find that the
operator breached implied covenant duties. But when an operator fails to
act as a reasonably prudent operator, it is not a valid defense that the
operator is performing as well as can be expected for someone who uses
outdated technology.
The emergence of shale plays and the techniques used in them
illustrate the importance of technological revolution. Shale plays did not
become economically feasible until relatively recently, with advances in
two technologies—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling—and those
technologies continue to evolve. If an operator is maintaining a lease with
production from a conventional formation, but is not using horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing to develop a shale formation found within
the leased premises, the lessor could argue that the operator has breached
an implied covenant of reasonable development or further exploration. At
least one lessor has made such an argument in a dispute regarding
development arising in the Fayetteville Shale area,166 and another made
the argument in a case relating to the Haynesville Shale.167 Further, there
is some case law in which courts have held that an operator’s failure to use
other advanced production techniques constituted a breach of the duty of
reasonable development.
The development of shale plays also raises the potential for such
claims. Successful development of shale formations is expensive. Several
of the shale formations are located in deep strata, and economic
development often requires horizontal laterals that are a mile or more in
length. For this reason, drilling is expensive. Further, hydraulic fracturing
is necessary and fracturing operations add still more expense. Indeed, the
expense of drilling and completing such wells may be beyond the
capability of some companies. But some of those companies may have
leases that are held by production—perhaps shallow oil or gas
production—in the area where shale plays are located. This creates the
potential for lessors to conclude that such a lessee’s failure to drill wells
to develop the shale formation is a breach of the lessee’s duty of reasonable
development. Or, perhaps the lessee has drilled and fractured some wells

166. See Acre v. Spindletop Oil & Gas Co., 2011 WL 902186, at *1 (E.D. Ark.).
167. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration and Production Co., 70 So. 3d 974 (La.
App. 2d 2011).
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to the shale formation, but the lessor believes that the lessee has not drilled
enough wells.
Such a claim was brought in Ferrara v. Questar Exploration and
Production Co., a dispute that arose in an area where the Haynesville Shale
is located.168 In that case, the lessor gave notice to the lessee and then
brought suit for an alleged breach of implied covenant duties not long after
news of early success in the shale play first became public. The Louisiana
Second Circuit held that the lessors failed to prove that a reasonably
prudent operator would have responded that quickly and therefore failed
to prove that the lessee had breached its implied covenant duties. A similar
claim was made by a lessor who owned land in the area of Arkansas where
the Fayetteville Shale is located.169 In the Arkansas case, the lessee’s
motion for summary judgment was denied and the case continued.
A recent case from Ohio also noted the role that implied covenants
might play in protecting lessors’ interests as technology changes.
Specifically, in Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co.,170 the Ohio
Supreme Court stated: “We also note that the implied covenant of
reasonable development is well suited to address the primary driver of the
Landowners’ interest here, namely the emergence of new drilling
technologies permitting production form deep strata that could not be
obtained before.”171
F. Summary of Implied Covenants Primer
Because of the uncertainties inherent in oil and gas exploration, leases
typically leave much to the discretion of the lessee. This prompts courts to
enforce various implied covenants against lessees. The implied covenants
most commonly recognized by courts and commentators include
covenants to drill a test well, reasonably develop the leased premises,
conduct further exploration, diligently market any product that is found in
paying quantities, protect the leased premises against drainage, and
reasonably restore the surface condition of the leased premises. But courts
generally will not impose an implied covenant that is inconsistent with the
express terms of a lease. Accordingly, lessees can attempt to limit the
scope of their duties under implied covenants by use of lease clauses that
expressly limit their duties.
In most states, a lessor must give his lessee notice and opportunity to
cure an alleged breach of an implied covenant before bringing suit. If a
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Acre v. Spindletop Oil & Gas Co., 2011 WL 902186, at *1 (E.D. Ark. 2011).
Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 95 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2018).
Id. at 309.
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lessor brings suit, seeking lease termination or a declaration that the lease
already has terminated, the jurisprudence of several states provides that a
lessee’s duties to drill additional wells is suspended while the suit is
pending; this is sometimes called the repudiation doctrine. The existence
of implied covenants, as well as their nature and scope, are issues of law.
The question of whether a lessee has breached an implied covenant
generally is an issue of fact, and the lessor who brings an implied covenant
claim generally will have the burden of proof.
II. POTENTIALLY EMERGING ISSUES
Changes in technology are raising new issues. For example, under
certain fact patterns, lessors might choose to assert arguments that their
lessees breached implied covenant duties by failing to utilize 3-D seismic
or horizontal drilling or hydraulic fracturing. But arguably some of the
most interesting emerging issues may relate to the implied covenant to
protect against drainage and express offset well covenants.
A. Duty to Protect Against Drainage by Fractures that Cross Property
Lines
Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy Trust is best known for its
decision regarding a subsurface trespass claim.172 In this case, the plaintiffs
brought a claim for subsurface trespass, alleging that the defendant had
committed a subsurface trespass by conducting a hydraulic fracturing
operation on neighboring land in such a manner that fractures crossed into
the subsurface of the area where the plaintiffs owned mineral rights (they
had granted a lease covering those rights). The only harm alleged by the
plaintiffs was the drainage of hydrocarbons. The court held that, under
these circumstances, the rule of capture precluded recovery for the
drainage of hydrocarbons and that the plaintiffs did not have an actionable
trespass. But Garza also recognized that a lessee might have a duty under
an implied covenant to protect its lessor against such drainage.
B. Duty to Protect Against Drainage in Vertical Direction
Severances of interests by depth seem to be becoming more common.
This may lead to drainage disputes between working interest owners when
the plane that divides the two lessees’ interests bisects a productive
formation (and possibly even if the plane does not bisect a productive
172. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
2008).
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formation if the plane is near enough to a productive formation). In most
cases, the same lessor will own both the shallow and the deep rights. But
if different lessors own deep and shallow rights, or if the same lessor owns
mineral rights as to all depths, but the two leases provide for substantially
different royalty amounts, a lessor may assert a drainage dispute about
drainage in the vertical direction, as opposed to the more typical drainage
complaint about drainage in the horizontal direction. Further, in some
jurisdictions, it may not be clear how the regulator will apply pooling and
spacing rules when competing wells are separated vertically, rather than
horizontally.
C. What is an Offset Well, and is There Really Drainage?
In Adams v. Murphy Exploration and Production Co.-USA, the lessors
asserted that the lessee breached an express offset well covenant.173 The
covenant provided that:
[I]n the event a well is completed as a producer of oil and/or gas
on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased premises, and within
467 feet of the premises covered by this lease, that Lessee herein
is hereby obligated to, within 120 days after the completion date
of the well or wells on the adjacent acreage, as follows:
(1) to commence drilling operations on the leased acreage and
thereafter continue the drilling of such off-set well or wells with
due diligence to a depth adequate to test the same formation from
which the well or wells are producing from on the adjacent
acreage; or
(2) pay the Lessor royalties as provided for in this lease as if an
equivalent amount of production of oil and/or gas were being
obtained from the off-set location on these leased premises as that
which is being produced from the adjacent well or wells; or
(3) release an amount of acreage sufficient to constitute a spacing
unit equivalent in size to the spacing unit that would be allocated
under this lease to such well or wells on the adjacent lands, as to
the zones or strata producing in such adjacent well.174
An operator on the neighboring tract drilled a horizontal well that triggered
application of this covenant. In response, Murphy Exploration drilled a
horizontal well on the leased premises. The horizontal well on the leased
173. Adams v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.-USA, 497 S.W.3d 510 (Tex.
App. 4th Dist. 2016).
174. Id. at 512.

444

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW

AND

RESOURCES

[Vol. VII

premises was spaced about 2,100 feet from the horizontal well that
triggered the offset well covenant. The lessor brought suit in state court in
Texas, asserting that the well that Murphy drilled did not qualify as an
offset well. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Murphy Exploration, dismissing the lessor’s claim. The lessor appealed.
The San Antonio appellate court concluded that the commonly
understood meaning of “offset well” is a well that is used to protect against
drainage. After considering the summary judgment evidence, the court
held that Murphy Exploration “failed to prove as a matter of law” that the
well drilled on the leased premises was protecting the premises from
drainage by the well on the neighboring tract.175 For this reason, the
appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Murphy
Exploration.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and
reinstated the trial court’s judgment.176 The Court noted that the offset well
clause did not specify how close to the lease lines the offset well needed
to be drilled.177 The Court acknowledged that an offset well often has been
viewed as a well that protects against drainage, but in the context of a lowpermeability formation, hydrocarbons do not migrate “in the same
fashion” as in a conventional reservoir.178 This suggests that neither the
existence vel non of drainage nor the effectiveness of a well in protecting
against drainage depends on proximity of either well to lease lines. The
Texas Supreme Court ultimately viewed the offset well clause as simply
triggering an obligation that the lessee drill a well in the specified
formation, now within any given distance from the lease lines.
The lessee eventually prevailed, but this case was a close call. Six
judges (the trial court judge and five justice of the Texas Supreme Court)
viewed the offset well clause as the lessee did, while seven judges (three
appellate court judges and four justices of the Texas Supreme Court)
viewed the clause as the lessor did. This illustrates that parties should
carefully consider the language of any express offset well covenants. For
example, do the parties intend that the lessee can satisfy the clause by
drilling any well to the same formation as the neighboring well that
triggered the offset well clause, or must the offset well be close enough to
the lease lines to protect against drainage? Does it matter whether the
neighboring well is drilled into a conventional formation or a lowpermeability formation? If hydraulic fracturing is being used in an area,
175. Id. at 517.
176. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.–USA v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105,
114 (Tex. 2018).
177. Id. at 111.
178. Id. at 112-13.
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what distance should the parties choose as the distance within which a well
on neighboring property will trigger an offset well covenant? Does it
matter if the neighboring well is not likely to drain the leased premises
because fractures are not likely to extend to the leased premises?
If the appellate court’s conclusion that a well must protect against
drainage in order to qualify as an “offset well” had prevailed—a result that
might be the outcome in some other state--would the lessor for lessees be
that they should insist that express offset well covenants be drafted to
avoid using the term “offset well,” and instead merely require that the
lessee drill a well within a specified distance of the lease line? If parties
decide to retain the phrasing that requires the lessee to drill an “offset
well,” the lessee also might benefit by language stating that this obligation
can be satisfied by drilling a well within a specified distance of the lease
line. Otherwise, the lessee would have to litigate whether its new well is
“close enough” to the lease boundary to protect against drainage and
qualify as an offset well.179
III. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
There are various considerations that parties should keep in mind with
respect to implied covenants when drafting or negotiating leases. These
considerations include clauses for the benefit of either the lessee or lessor.
This Article identifies more clauses that could be used to benefit lessees
than lessors. In part, this is because implied covenants burden lessees, not
lessors. And, in part, this is because most of the provisions that lessors
might use are clauses that impose express covenants or which convert
certain types of performance by a lessee from being covenants to being
limitations or conditions.
A. Clauses to Benefit Lessee
There are several types of clauses relating to implied covenants that a
lessee can utilize to protect itself. These include clauses that give the lessee
an opportunity to correct any alleged breach, clauses that limit the
remedies available in the case of breach, and clauses that lessen the
lessee’s implied contractual obligation by eliminating all (or some)
implied covenants or by restricting the obligation due under such
covenants. Some types of clauses that would benefit a lessee are discussed
below.
179. Presumably, a well drilled close to the lease line would protect against
drainage—in the sense of protecting against the possibility of drainage—even if
no drainage were occurring.
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1. Notice and Cure Clause
Lessees should consider including in their leases a clause that requires
a lessor to give the lessee written notice of any alleged breach of an implied
covenant, as well as a reasonable opportunity to cure the breach, before
the lessor files suit based on the alleged breach. Someone could ask
whether including a contractual notice-and-cure clause in a lease will
really matter. After all, at least one jurisdiction generally makes notice and
an opportunity to cure a prerequisite to any implied covenant claim,180 and,
in many other states, jurisprudence provides that the equitable remedy of
lease cancellation is unavailable if a lessor fails to give the lessee notice
and a reasonable opportunity-to-cure before bringing suit.181
Nevertheless, a contractual notice-and-cure clause can provide certain
benefits to the lessee. First, an occasional court may not follow the
generally accepted jurisprudential rule that makes notice and an
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a suit for lease termination even when
a lease does not contain a notice-and-cure clause. But such a court may
enforce a contractual agreement for notice and an opportunity to cure.
Because lease termination can be a harsh remedy, the lessee may greatly
benefit from having notice of any alleged breach and an opportunity to
cure it.
Second, in many states, jurisprudence does not make notice and an
opportunity to cure a prerequisite to a lessor’s suit for damages.182 In some
circumstances, a lessee may be able to cure an alleged breach and preclude
an action for damages altogether, provided that the lessee is given notice
of the breach and time to make a cure. If the lessee does so, this could save
legal costs by avoiding litigation. It also could help prevent the lessee from
being on the losing end of a money judgment, and it might help preserve
some degree of a working relationship between the lessor and lessee. Even
if those benefits cannot be obtained, the requirement of notice and
opportunity to cure may provide a modest benefit by delaying litigation.
If parties agree to include a notice-and-cure clause in their lease, they
will need to decide whether notice and an opportunity to cure will be a
prerequisite to: any action by the lessor; any action for breach of
covenants—whether implied or express; any action based on implied
covenants; or any action seeking lease termination. In addition, they will
need to decide the length of the cure period. Will the lessee be allowed a

180. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:136.
181. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.
182. See id.
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“reasonable” time, a specifically-stated number of days, or the greater of
either a reasonable time or a specified number of days?
In addition, they will need to decide whether the lessee must
commence a cure or complete a cure. Given that planning, drilling, and
completing a well can be a lengthy process, and that curing an alleged
breach often will involve these tasks, the lessee should bargain for the
clause to be drafted so that it merely requires the commencement of a cure,
rather than the completion of a cure. If the clause merely requires
commencement of the cure, the lessor should ask for the clause to require
that, once commenced, the process of curing the alleged breach must be
prosecuted to completion with reasonable diligence. As an alternative to
merely requiring that a cure be commenced with the cure period, a lessee
could protect itself by bargaining for a lengthy cure period, but a lessor
probably will want a reasonably short period for commencement of a cure.
The language of a notice and cure clause will depend in part on the
parties’ choices regarding these issues. A lease from North Dakota
contained a clause that allowed the lessee a specified number of days to
commence a cure. The clause stated:
In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has failed to comply with
any obligation hereunder, express or implied, Lessor shall notify
Lessee in writing specifying in what respects Lessor claims Lessee
has breached this lease. The service of such notice and the lapse
of sixty days without Lessee’s meeting or commencing to meet
the alleged breaches shall be a condition precedent to any action
by Lessor for any cause. If within sixty days after receipt of such
notice Lessee shall meet or commence to meet the breaches
alleged by Lessor, Lessee shall not be deemed in default
hereunder. The breach by Lessee of any obligation hereunder shall
not work a forfeiture or termination, in whole or in part, of this
lease.183
A lease at issue in a case from Tennessee contained a clause that appears
to require the lessor to give the lessee a specified number of days to
complete a cure, though the specified cure period seems too short to be of
much use to the lessee unless the lessor alleges a breach that is very simple
to cure. The clause states:
Lessors shall make no claim of default against Lessees or their
assigns until Lessors, or their assigns, first notify the Lessees
183. Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. P’shp, 553 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1996). For
additional examples, see MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.1.
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herein of such claim and unless such default is not cured within
10 days after notice. Notice of default is effective when delivered
or placed in the U.S. Mail, certified, addressed to the Lessees
named herein at.184
If the parties preferred to specify that the lessee would have a reasonable
time to cure, they could substitute “a reasonable time” in place of the
reference to a specific number of days in the examples above. An
alternative that would be even better for the lessee would be to substitute
something like “the greater of a reasonable time or sixty days” (or some
larger number of days) in place of “sixty days” in the first example quoted
above.
If a lessee is concerned that it is difficult to predict how long it will
take to complete a cure of a breach, he might seek to add language such
as, “Lessee shall not, however, be deemed to be in default while work is
in progress in good faith which when completed will constitute
compliance with such condition or covenant.”185
2. Judicial Ascertainment Clause
Lessees should consider adding a judicial ascertainment clause to their
oil and gas leases, using such a clause as a supplement to a clause requiring
that the lessor give the lessee notice and an opportunity to cure before
filing suit for an alleged breach of implied covenants. A judicial
ascertainment clause seeks to address a dilemma that lessees sometimes
face—a dilemma that the notice-and-cure clause, to which the judicial
ascertainment clause is often compared, cannot resolve.
Suppose, for example, that a lessor gives written notice to the lessee,
asserting that the lessee had breached the implied covenant of reasonable
development and demanding that the lessee drill an additional well within
a reasonable time. The lessee believes in good faith that the proposed well
is unnecessary and that it might even be counterproductive. Further,
drilling the well would be very expensive. But a contrary reading of the
geologic evidence is plausible. If the lessee drills, it will spend a large
amount of money on a well that might be unprofitable and even
counterproductive. If the lessee refuses to drill the proposed well, the
lessor might bring suit. If a jury finds that the lessor’s expert is sufficiently
convincing, the lessor might prevail, and a possible remedy could be lease
184. Lone Star Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Howard, No. E2009-00428-COA-R3-CV,
2010 WL 520934, at *2, n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2010).
185. This clause is quoted in a prominent treatise. See MARTIN & KRAMER,
supra note 132, at § 681.1.
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termination. The lessee would be willing to spend the money to drill if it
had to do so in order to save the lease, but the lessee would like its “day in
court” to contest the need for the proposed well.
This is a type of situation in which a judicial ascertainment clause can
help a lessee. Such a clause provides that the lease will not be terminated
on account of a breach of the implied covenants until there is a judicial
determination that there has been a breach and the lessee fails to drill after
having been given a reasonable amount of time to do so. A key question
is whether judicial ascertainment clauses are enforceable. In some
jurisdictions, courts have indicated that such clauses are enforceable.
Examples include the Louisiana Supreme Court186 and a Colorado
appellate court.187 In other jurisdictions, courts have indicated that judicial
ascertainment clauses are not enforceable. Examples include the West
Virginia Supreme Court,188 an Ohio appellate court,189 and a Texas
appellate court.190
The courts that have held that judicial ascertainment clauses are not
enforceable have expressed three concerns. First, judicial ascertainment
clauses would result in piecemeal litigation that “would require at least
two trials and two final judgments.”191 Second, some of the courts rejecting
judicial ascertainment clauses have concluded that the lessee often has
greater resources than the lessor, and that a lessee might take advantage of
a judicial ascertainment clause to extract concessions from the lessor.192
And finally, certain courts have said that, in a jurisdiction that recognizes
that leases can terminate by abandonment, a judicial ascertainment clause
should not affect termination by abandonment.193
186. See Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135 (La. 1956). See also B.A. Kelly
Land Co. v Questar Expl. and Prod. Co., 106 So. 3d 181, 192 (La. App. 2d 2012)
(judicial ascertainment clause was enforceable).
187. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 374 (Colo. App. 1984).
188. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 262 (W. Va. 2001) (under
West Virginia law, judicial ascertainment clause in oil and gas lease is void as
against public policy).
189. Conny Farms, Ltd. v. Ball Res., Inc., No. 09 CO 36, 2011 WL 5053625,
at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2011) (under Ohio law, judicial ascertainment clause
is against public policy and is void).
190. Frick-Reid Supply Corp. v. Meers, 52 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. App. 1932).
191. A Texas appellate court stated this, Frick-Reid, 52 S.W.2d at 118 and the
West Virginia Supreme Court quoted Frick-Reid on this point. Wellman, 557
S.E.2d at 259-60. The Ohio appellate court cited both Frick-Reid and Wellman.
See Conny Farms, 2011 WL 5053625.
192. See, e.g., Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 260.
193. Id.
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But these concerns seem misplaced. The first concern is the concern
that a judicial ascertainment clause would result in piecemeal litigation,
requiring “two trials,” but application of a judicial ascertainment clause
would not require two full trials. If the lessee prevailed in the “first” trial,
that would be the end of the litigation. If the lessor prevailed, the court
would find liability and enter an order that the lease would terminate if the
lessee does not drill an additional well within a time specified in the order.
If the lessee timely drills the required well, the lease will continue and
there is no need for a second trial. If the lessee fails to do that, there will
be no need for a second trial. Only if it is unclear whether the lessee has
complied will there be a need for another hearing, and, in such a case, the
only issue to resolve would be a narrow one—whether the lessee timely
drilled the well required in the original order. There would be no need to
re-litigate whether a prudent lessee would drill the well because that issue
was decided in the first trial.
Further, there is another strong argument as to why the concern about
piecemeal litigation is misplaced. As noted in the Section of this Article
dealing with remedies for the breach of an implied covenant, many
jurisdictions have held that conditional termination is a permissible
remedy.194 That is, a court that finds that a lessee has breached an implied
covenant may enter an order stating that the lease will terminate (in whole
or part) unless the lessee drills a sell by a specified date. Indeed, some
courts have stated that, although outright termination is also a permissible
remedy, conditional termination is favored over outright termination.
The widespread acceptance of conditional terminations is important
because a judicial ascertainment clause is essentially a clause stating that,
if a court is going to order termination as a remedy, the order should
provide for conditional termination, not outright termination.195 Thus, if
use of conditional termination does not create an undue risk of piecemeal
litigation, the enforcement of a judicial ascertainment clause should not
create undue risk of piecemeal litigation because all the clause does is
mandate that any termination will be a conditional termination. This is
notable because, although West Virginia’s Supreme Court has stated that
194. See supra Section I(D)(5).
195. A prominent commentator noted the seeming incongruity between
concerns about piecemeal litigation and the general acceptance of conditional
termination. See Maurice H. Merrill, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES, § 201 (1940) (referring to the “alternative
decree”). Further, in Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 373-4 (Colo. App.
1984), the court concluded that the lack of an adequate remedy at law, combined
with the existence of a judicial ascertainment clause a lease, justified the trial
court’s award of a conditional decree of cancellation.

2019]

IMPLIED COVENANTS AND THE DRAFTING OF OIL AND GAS LEASES

451

judicial ascertainment clauses are void (in part because of the danger of
piecemeal litigation), that court has accepted the use of conditional
termination.196 And, although a Texas appellate court concluded that a
judicial ascertainment clause is void (in part because of the danger of
piecemeal litigation), the Texas Supreme Court has expressed approval for
the use of conditional termination.197
As for the concern that lessees often have more resources than lessors
and that they might abuse a judicial ascertainment clause, there are several
responses. Of course, though lessees often have more resources than
lessors, this is not always the case. Moreover, if the covenant that allegedly
has been breached is a covenant to develop or explore, the lessor will be
receiving royalties (those covenants do not apply until production has been
established) and any delay in additional development or exploration will
not cause a permanent loss. Instead, it will simply mean a delay in the
lessor receiving an even higher instream of royalty income. Further, it
seems unlikely that a lessee will typically be in a position to coerce
concessions from a lessor merely by delaying the commencement of
drilling or other activities that would increase the lessor’s stream of
royalties. Of course, if the implied covenant to protect against drainage is
at issue, a delay in performance could result in a permanent loss, but a
lessor can pursue a money damages award for drainage. Judicial
ascertainment clauses typically apply only to actions for lease termination,
not to claims for money damages.
Nevertheless, to the extent that a court is worried about the potential
abuse of judicial ascertainment clauses, the court could follow the lead of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which stated that judicial ascertainment
clauses are enforceable, provided that there is a bona fide dispute.198 That
is, a lessee cannot simply refuse to perform when it has no valid defense,
then invoke a judicial ascertainment clause to escape consequences. Also,
it is worth noting that there have not been widespread reports of abuse of
judicial ascertainment clauses in the jurisdictions where these clauses are
enforceable.
The third and final argument against the enforceability of judicial
ascertainment clauses is that it would be unreasonable to enforce such a
clause when a lease has been abandoned. But for a couple of reasons this
196. See Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 173 S.E. 573 (W. Va. 1934); Adkins
v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932).
197. W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 32 (Tex. 1929)
(referring to “alternative decree”). See also Slaughter v. Cities Service Oil Co.,
660 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App. 1983); Wes-Tex Land Co. v. Simmons, 566 S.W.2d
719 (Tex. App. 1978).
198. Melancon v. Texas, 89 So. 2d 135, 146 (La. 1956).
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argument cannot plausibly support a general rule against the enforcement
of judicial ascertainment clauses. For one thing, not all states recognize
that leases can be lost by abandonment. More important, even in states that
take the view that leases are subject to abandonment, this final concern
need not stand in the way of enforcing judicial ascertainment clauses in
circumstances that do not involve an abandoned lease. In other words, the
fact that a judicial ascertainment clause would not apply if a lease has been
abandoned should not preclude application of a judicial ascertainment
clause when a lease has not been abandoned and the lessor merely alleges
a breach of an implied covenant.
In short, the main arguments against enforcement of judicial
ascertainment clauses seem flawed. Further, there are policy reasons that
weigh in support of the enforceability of such clauses. One such policy
reason is the public policy favoring freedom of contract. Second, there is
widespread recognition that lease termination can be a harsh remedy. An
order of conditional termination, pursuant to a judicial ascertainment
clause, allows the lessee to avoid the harsh remedy of outright termination.
Third, use of conditional termination can even benefit the lessor.
Suppose, for example, that a court concludes that the lessee has breached
an implied covenant, and the court enters an order that the lease will
terminate unless the lessee drills a well by a certain time. If the lessee
performs in response to a court’s decision, the lessor will receive the
benefit of that performance.199 Indeed, in such a case, the lessor will
probably receive the benefit of performance (the drilling of the well)
sooner than if the court had granted an order cancelling the lease outright
and the lessor had been put in the position of finding a new lessee or
turning to a top lessee. The main downside is that, in the event that the
lessee does not perform, the ultimate lease termination will be delayed by
the amount of time that the lessee was given to perform, but that delay
likely will be short in relation to the time that the litigation will take. Such
a potential delay would seem to be outweighed by the benefits of enforcing
the judicial ascertainment clause to which the parties agreed.
Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, courts hold that judicial
ascertainment clauses are unenforceable. In such jurisdictions, rather than
drafting leases to include a judicial ascertainment clause, lessees should
consider drafting clauses in which the parties agree that any order granting
termination as a remedy should be an order of conditional termination,
rather than outright termination (see the next Section of this Article,
199. Of course, damages may also have to be awarded in order to give a
complete remedy in the event that the particular implied covenant that has been
breached is the implied covenant to protect against drainage.
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Section III(A)(3) below). If, however, a prospective lessee negotiates to
include a judicial ascertainment clause in a lease, a question may arise as
to the specific language that would be used. The following are examples
of judicial ascertainment clauses.
Example from Louisiana
After production of oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral has been
secured from the land covered hereby or land pooled therewith,
this lease shall not be subject to forfeiture or loss, either in whole
or in part, for failure to conduct operations in compliance with this
contract except after judicial ascertainment that Lessee has failed
to conduct such operations and has been given a reasonable
opportunity after such judicial ascertainment to prevent such loss
or forfeiture by complying with and discharging its obligations as
to which Lessee has been judicially determined to be default.200
Example from Montana
This lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for breach of
implied covenant until it shall have been finally judicially
determined that such breach exists and lessees shall have failed
within a reasonable time of such final determination, to remedy
such breach.201
Readers should note that the typical judicial ascertainment clause limits
the circumstances in which forfeiture of a lease is a permissible remedy
for breach of a covenant; such clauses typically have no application to
limitations that provide for automatic termination of the lease or to
conditions that give the lessor the right to terminate it.202 Nevertheless, a
judicial ascertainment clause could be drafted so that it applies to
limitations and conditions, effectively modifying them so that they do not
provide for termination unless the lessee fails to correct them after a
judicial ascertainment of facts that otherwise would terminate the lease.
Examples of judicial ascertainment clauses that are drafted to apply to

200. B.A. Kelly Land Co., L.L.C. v. Questar Exploration and Production Co.,
106 So. 3d 181, 184-5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 112 So. 3d 223 (La.
2013) (judicial ascertainment clause was enforceable).
201. Eddington v. Creek Oil Co., 690 P.2d 970, 974 (Mont. 1984).
202. King v. Estate of Gilbreath, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1177 (D. N. Mex.
2016); Tisdale v. Walla, 1994 WL 738744 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist.); Babb v.
Clemenson, 687 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 1996); Eddington v. Creek Oil Co.,
690 P.2d 970, 974 (Mont. 1984).
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limitations and conditions, not just breaches of covenants, are shown
below.
Example from Colorado
It is agreed that this lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for
failure to perform in whole or in part any of its implied covenants,
conditions, or stipulations until it shall have first been finally
judicially determined that such failure exists, and after such final
determination, lessee is given a reasonable time therefrom to
comply with any such covenants, conditions, or stipulations.203
Example from Ohio
It is agreed that this lease shall never be forfeited or cancelled for
failure to perform, in whole or in part, any of its covenants,
conditions or stipulations, until it shall have been first finally
judicially determined that such failure exists, and after such final
determination, lessee is given a reasonable time therefrom to
comply with any such covenants, conditions or stipulations.204
Example from West Virginia
This lease shall never be forfeited or terminated for failure of
Lessee to perform in whole or in part any of its express or implied
covenants, conditions or obligations until it shall have been first
finally judicially determined that such failure exists, and Lessee
shall have been given a reasonable time after such final
determination within which to comply with any such covenants,
conditions or obligations.205
3. Clause Restricting Termination Remedy to Conditional
Termination
Prospective lessees should consider including in their leases a clause
in which the parties agree that, if the court decides to grant lease
termination as a remedy, the order granting such relief will be an order of
conditional termination, rather than an order of outright termination. Such
203. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 371 (Colo. App. 1984).
204. Conny Farms, Ltd., 2011 WL 5053625, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.).
205. Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 258 (W. Va. 2001).
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that judicial ascertainment clauses are
unenforceable, so this clause was not enforced, but the court’s reasoning was not
based on the particular wording of the clause.
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a clause could be called a “conditional termination” clause. The
enforcement of such a clause would provide the same benefits as would
be provided by the enforcement of a judicial ascertainment clause. Thus,
a conditional termination clause might be particularly useful in states
where courts refuse to enforce judicial ascertainment clauses.
It is possible that a jurisdiction that bars enforcement of judicial
ascertainment clauses might choose to bar enforcement of a conditional
termination clause. On the other hand, some of the same jurisdictions that
bar enforcement of judicial ascertainment clauses allow the use of
conditional termination. Further, courts often will follow the terms of a
retained acreage clause, and a conditional termination clause is somewhat
similar to a retained acreage clause. A retained acreage clause purports to
preclude complete termination while allowing partial termination. A
conditional termination clause likewise purports to preclude outright
termination, while allowing conditional termination.
In order to drive home the analogy between the conditional
termination clause and a retained acreage clauses, the parties should
consider combining the two clauses into a single section of the lease, and
drafting the language of the conditional termination clause to track the
language of the retained acreage clause. Such a combined clause might
read as follows:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause,
the cancellation or termination shall be a partial cancellation or
termination, meaning that lessee shall have the right to retain
under the terms hereof,
acres of land around each oil or gas
well producing, being working on, or drilling hereunder (as long
as such operations are continued in good faith) such tract to be
designated by lessee in as near a square form as practicable.
Further, the parties agree that, if any cancellation or termination
of this lease is granted as a remedy for any breach of an implied
or express covenant to drill a development, exploratory, or offset
well, the cancellation or termination shall be a conditional
cancellation or termination, meaning that the remedy shall be an
order (sometimes called an “alternative decree”) that the lessee
must drill such a well within a reasonable time or the lease will be
cancelled or terminate automatically, except as to
acres of
land around each oil or gas well producing, being working on, or
drilling hereunder.206
206. The clause proposed above does not come from an actual lease. The
retained acreage portion of the clause is a modified version of a retained acreage
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4. Clause Restricting Termination Remedy to Partial Termination
A prospective lessee should consider use of a retained acreage clause
in order to limit a lessor’s remedy for breach of implied covenants to
partial termination.
As noted in the Section of this Article that discusses remedies, if a
court finds that a lessee has breached implied covenants and that the proper
remedy is lease termination, the court sometimes will decide even in the
absence of a retained acreage clause to order partial termination, rather
than complete termination. Such an order might terminate the lease as to
areas that the lessee had not prudently developed or explored, or where the
lessee had not protected against drainage, while allowing the lessee to
retain its rights as to the other portions of the lease. As a slight variation
on this concept, an order might terminate the lease except for the wellbore
of any productive wells and perhaps a modest amount of acreage around
each. But in other cases, a court might order complete lease termination,
even if the lessee had one or more productive wells. Such an order could
be very costly. A retained acreage clause is a provision by which the
parties agree that any time lease termination is ordered as a remedy, the
termination will be partial termination, not complete termination.
If the parties agree to such a clause, the clause should address certain
issues such as whether the clause applies to any lease terminations or only
terminations that are based on a certain cause. Another issue is the amount
of acreage that the lessee will retain. Some clauses allow the lessee to
retain a specified number of acres, while other clauses may vary the size
of the retained area depending on the depth of the well, whether the well
is an oil well or a gas well, or the spacing and pooling rules and orders of
the state’s oil and gas regulator. Another issue is whether the lessee will
retain rights as to all depths within the retained acreage, or only certain
depths. Another issue to consider is the shape of the retained area.
Finally, the lessee will want to ensure that a clause is not written too
narrowly. The lessee will want to draft the clause to retain acreage around
wells that are being drilled or reworked, in addition to any wells that are
producing at the time of the order of termination. Further, a lessee should
consider including in the clause provisions that will preserve certain
surface rights even as to the areas where the lease is terminated. For
example, the lessee will want the right to continue using any pipelines,

clause quoted elsewhere in this Article. See supra note 202 and accompanying
text. The conditional termination portion was drafted by the author of this Article.
Other drafters may be able to improve upon it.
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support facilities, or access roads, even if those are located on lands where
the lessee’s working interest is terminated.207
An example of a retained acreage clause that allowed the lessee to
keep a specified number of acres around each well stated:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause,
lessee shall have the right to retain under the terms hereof, twenty
(20) acres of land around each oil or gas well producing, being
working on, or drilling hereunder (as long as such operations are
continued in good faith) such tract to be designated by lessee in as
near a square form as practicable.208
A lease involved in another case contained a clause stating that the lessee
would be entitled to retain the greater of forty acres or the amount of
acreage allotted to the well under a spacing order or rule of the state’s oil
and gas regulator. This clause stated:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause,
Lessee shall have the right to retain under the terms hereof forty
acres of land around each well producing, being worked on, or
drilling hereunder, unless there be in force in said area at such time
a spacing order or regulation of the Conservation Commissioner
or other governmental agency allocating more than forty acres to
each well, in which case Lessee shall have the right to retain
around each such well the number of acres allocated to each well
under such order or regulation. The tract so retained shall be
designated by Lessee in as near a square form as practicable.209
A clause that provides for the lessee retaining producing wells (and wells
being drilled), but which does not expressly provide for the retention of
acreage around the wells, provided:
Notwithstanding any forfeiture of this lease, the Lessee shall have
the right to retain any and all wells being drilled, or producing or
capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, at the time of

207. “Working interest” has been defined as the “operating interest under an
oil and gas lease.” MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS, supra note 35, at 1156..
208. Francis v. Pritchett, 278 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955, error ref’d).
The clause quoted above, as well as some of the other clauses quoted above and
yet other clauses are cited in a prominent treatise. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra
note 132, at § 681.1.
209. Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135 (La. 1956).
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such forfeiture.210
A prominent treatise quotes clauses from two California leases that sought
to preserve certain surface rights that it might need in the area where its
lease rights otherwise were terminated. One of the leases contained a
clause stating:
A termination of this lease as to a part only of the leased land or
as to a part only of Lessee’s rights shall not affect such rights of
way and easements as may be necessary in Lessee’s operations on
the part of the leased land as to which no such termination shall
have occurred.211
The clause in the other California lease stated:
Notwithstanding any partial termination of this lease, whether by
surrender, forfeiture, or otherwise, Lessee shall have such rightsof-way over, upon, and across the land with respect to which this
lease has terminated as are necessary or convenient for Lessee’s
operations hereunder on the leased land retained by it.212
5. Clause to Preclude Termination as a Remedy
In some leases, parties have agreed to a clause that purports to
preclude termination as a remedy. An example of such a clause states:
[N]o part of this lease shall be forfeited or terminated by reason of
the breach of any implied condition or covenants thereof.213
6. Clause Suspending Implied Covenant Duties During Challenge to
Lease
A prospective lessee should bargain for its oil and gas lease to include
a clause that suspends the lessee’s implied covenant obligations during any
period when the lessor or some other person challenges a lease. Such a
challenge could be a lawsuit or arbitration in which the lessee seeks a
ruling that terminates the lease as a remedy for the lessee’s alleged breach
of some obligation. Alternatively, the challenge may involve an assertion
210. Danker v. Lee, 137 Cal. App. 2d 797, 291 P.2d 73, 5 O.&G.R. 313 (1955).
211. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 681.3.
212. Id.
213. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Christian, 83 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935, error ref’d).
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by the lessor or some other person that the lease is unenforceable because
it allegedly has terminated, was procured by fraud, or was granted by
someone who lacked title to the minerals covered by the lease. Absent a
lease clause that suspends the lessee’s implied covenant obligations during
such a challenge, the lessee may face an unpleasant choice.
One choice is that the lessee can spend money on drilling or other
development activities, even though that investment may be lost if the
lessor prevails on its challenge to the lease. Given that drilling and other
development activities can be costly, this choice is risky. Indeed, if the
lessor or other person challenging the lease asserts that the lease is not
enforceable (as opposed to seeking termination of an enforceable lease as
a remedy), a lessee who drills an additional well faces risks beyond the
possibility of losings its investment. If a putative lessee drills a dry hole at
a time that the lessee lacked any rights under the lease, the lessee may have
trespass liability. Such liability may require the company to pay money
damages to compensate the owner of the mineral rights for any loss of
leasing opportunity or diminution in value of the minerals that might be
caused by news of the dry hole.214 Given these risks, lessees often conclude
that the most prudent course is to refrain from further development until
the challenge to the lease is resolved.
But if the lessee chooses to refrain from additional investment until a
challenge is resolved, that choice could raise certain questions. For
example, could the lessee’s lack of further drilling while the lease was
being challenged constitute a breach of one of the implied covenants? If
the original challenge to the lease is found to be valid, this question may
be irrelevant because the success of the original challenge may mean that
the lease is unenforceable anyway. But if a court rejects the original
challenge, holding that it lacked merit, it may be very relevant to know
whether the lessee’s lack of drilling during the challenge to the lease
constitutes a breach—perhaps even a breach that would justify lease
termination. If the original challenge to the lease is brought during the
primary term, at a time when the lessee has not yet established production,
a somewhat similar question can arise. If the primary term ends while the
challenge to the lease is pending, will the lease terminate for a lack of
production in paying quantities if the lessee refrains from drilling during
the lease challenge?
In most states that have significant oil and gas jurisprudence, case law
protects the lessee by extending the primary term (if a challenge to the

214. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. App. 1927);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. App. 1925).
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lease occurs during the primary term)215 and by providing that the lessee’s
implied covenant duties are suspended while a suit is pending in which the
lessor alleges that the lease has terminated or requests termination as a
remedy.216
Such jurisprudence seems appropriate. Given the substantial costs of
drilling and completing wells, and the economic risks inherent in almost
any drilling project, it generally would be unfair to expect a lessee to drill
on the leased premises while a challenge to the lease is pending. In such
cases, it simply is not prudent or practical for the lessee to engage in
drilling. This is true whether the challenge to the lease is brought by the
lessor or some other person, but when the challenge is asserted by the
lessor, it would be doubly unfair to expect the lessee to conduct drilling or
other significant operations while the challenge is pending. In such cases
(and remember, we are now considering cases in which the original
challenge to the lease lacked merit), the lessor himself has interfered with
the lessee’s rights and created the circumstances that make it impractical
for the lessee to drill. The lessor should not be allowed to profit from its
own erroneous challenge.
Moreover, if the law did not excuse a lessee from any expectation of
drilling wells during a challenge to the validity of the lease, a lessee would
sometimes be put in the position that, in order to protect its rights or fulfill
its contractual obligations, it must go onto the lessor’s property to drill a
well in direct defiance of the lessor’s claim that the lessee is trespassing
on the property and has no right to be there. This risks an escalation of
disputes.
Finally, it is notable that, if a lessor seeks termination of a lease as a
remedy because the lessee allegedly breached the lease by failing to drill
during the original challenge to the lease, the lessee would be seeking an
equitable remedy. Equity seeks to do justice and achieve fairness. It can
hardly be said to be just or fair to reward a lessor for bringing a lease
challenge that lacks merit, thereby effectively punishing the lessee who
was the victim of the original, meritless challenge. These are the reasons
why states that have addressed the issue have been virtually unanimous in
concluding that the lessee’s implied covenant duties are suspended during
215. Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (La. 1953); Sw. Energy Prod.
Co. v. Elkins, 2010 Ark. 481, 374 S.W.3d 678, 685 (2010); Greer v. Carter Oil
Co., 373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1940); cf. Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex.
56, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957); Bingham v. Stevenson, 148 Mont. 209, 420 P.2d 839,
842 (1966).
216. See, e.g., Spaeth v. Union Oil Co., 710 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Oklahoma law); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 938-9 (Okla.
1943).
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the time that the lessor challenges the lease, and that the primary term is
extended.
But at least one state has staked out a contrary position, at least with
respect to the question of whether the primary term is extended. In
Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., an oil and gas lessor filed suit during
the primary term, alleging that the lease had been fraudulently induced and
therefore was invalid.217 Approximately two days before the end of the
primary term, the federal district court issued a summary judgment
dismissing the lessor’s claims, stating that he had “not offered any
evidence” to support his claim.218 But the district court refused to extend
the primary term.219 The lessee appealed to the United States Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, which certified a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court as to whether Pennsylvania follows the so-called repudiation
doctrine, also sometimes called the lessor-interference doctrine, which
provides that the primary term of a lease is extended when a lessor file suit
challenging the validity of a lease.220 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
accepted the certified question, then held that, under Pennsylvania law, a
lessor’s filing and prosecution of an action asserting that a lease is invalid
is not sufficient to justify an extension of the primary term.221
Of course, Harrison dealt only with the question of whether the
primary term of a lease would be extended, not whether a lessee’s implied
covenant duties would be suspended. Sound arguments exist for the
proposition that implied covenant duties should be suspended, even if the
primary term is not extended. For example, Harrison’s refusal to extend
the primary term was merely a refusal to use the unfairness of lessor’s
erroneous challenge to a lease as grounds to modify the lease (by

217. 110 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2015).
218. Harrison v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 588, 594 (M.D.
Pa.) (the judgment is dated August 14, 2012, whereas the lease, which had a fiveyear primary term, was signed on August 16, 2007).
219. Id. at 597.
220. Harrison v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 110 A.3d 178, 179 (Pa. 2015).
221. Id. at 185. The court said that it would not rule out an equitable extension
of the primary term if the lessor made a more “affirmative repudiation of a lease”
than merely filing a suit alleging that the lease was unenforceable because
allegedly it had been fraudulently induced. Id. at 186. Many observers might
conclude that such a lawsuit is an affirmative repudiation of the lease. Perhaps
one of the types of action that the court would consider a more affirmative
repudiation than such a lawsuit would be a lessor’s “affirmative” refusal to allow
the lessee to enter the property. See id. at 186, n.6.
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extending the primary term).222 But if a court imposed liability on a lessee
for “breaching” implied covenant duties by failing to drill wells during the
time when the lessor himself makes such drilling impractical, such a
holding could be remarkably unfair. Further, although damages are
sometimes awarded as a remedy for breach of an implied covenant, it is
notable that a common form of remedy is a form of equitable relief,
forfeiture of the lease. Given that equity generally abhors a forfeiture, it
would be odd for a court to exercise its equitable powers by terminating a
lease in these circumstances, thereby punishing the lessee that is the victim
of the lessor’s initial, erroneous challenge to the lease, and allowing the
lessor to benefit from his erroneous challenge.
Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that a lessor may attempt to extend
Harrison, citing it as support for an argument that implied covenant duties
should not be suspended during an erroneous challenge to a lease.
Accordingly, lessees should consider including in their leases a clause that
expressly suspends implied covenant duties for a period in which a lessor
seeks lease termination or asserts that the lease already has terminated.
Such a clause could also provide for an extension of the primary term. (In
Harrison, the court asserted that the lessee should have bargained for such
a clause.) A lease form commonly used in Louisiana states:
Should the right or interest of Lessee hereunder be disputed by
Lessor, or any other person, the time covered by the pendency of
such dispute shall not be counted against Lessee either as affecting
the term of the lease or for any other purpose, and Lessee may
suspend all payments without interest until there is a final
adjudication or other determination of such dispute.223
Such language might work, but it does not expressly provide for a
suspension of implied covenants. Something like the following language
would be more explicit:
If the Lessee or any other person seeks termination of the Lease
(in whole or part) or asserts that that the Lease is not valid or not
enforceable (in whole or part), any implied covenant duties will
be suspended during such a challenge to the Lease. Further, any
time during which a court action, arbitration, or regulatory
222. This statement is not intended to diminish the unfairness of allowing the
lessor in Harrison to benefit from its wrongful filing of a lawsuit that alleged fraud
even though the lessor had no evidence of fraud.
223. The quoted language comes from paragraph 11 of Bath’s Form Louisiana
Spec. 14-BR1-2A/12/79, which is available from M.L. Bath Company Ltd., Inc.
in Shreveport, Louisiana.
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challenge to the Lease is pending, shall not be counted against the
Lessee for purposes of the Lease, including, but not limited to, the
running of the time allowed for the primary term, any time periods
allowed under any saving clauses, and the time limits (if any) on
the duration of any force majeure situation or application of a shutin well clause.
A much lengthier, but even more explicit clause might read:
While a Lease Termination Action is pending,224 the Lessee will
not have any implied covenant obligations225 with respect to any
portion of the Leased Premises where the Lessor or some other
person contends the Lease should be terminated, cancelled, or
forfeited, or where the Lessor or some other person contends the
Lease already is void, unenforceable or has terminated. Further, if
a Lease Termination Action is asserted during the primary term of
the Lease, the primary term will be extended by the length of time
that the Lease Termination Action is pending. Similarly, whether
a Lease Termination Action is asserted during or after the primary
term, the time during which a Lease Termination Action is
pending will not count against the Lessee for purposes of any time
limit to act to maintain this Lease under a lease savings clause or
for any other purpose, except that the time for payment of any
lease royalties on actual production will not be delayed if there is
no dispute regarding what person is entitled to receive such
payments.226 For purposes of this clause, a “Lease Termination
Action” is a lawsuit, arbitration, or similar proceeding in which
Lessor or some other person contends: that the Lease (in whole or
part) is void, invalid, abandoned, or otherwise unenforceable; that
the Lease (in whole or part) is no longer valid and enforceable; or
that the Lease (in whole or part) should be terminated, cancelled,
224. The lessee should consider whether this clause should be broadened to
cover both circumstances in which a suit has been filed and circumstances in
which a suit has not been filed, but the lessor or some other person has challenged
the lease.
225. The lessee should consider whether there are any express obligations that
should be suspended.
226. The lessee should consider whether there are any other time limits that
should be extended during the pendency of a Lease Termination Action. If so,
perhaps the lease should expressly note that those time periods will be extended
also. For example, if a lease limits the length of time that a lessee can rely on a
force majeure clause or a shut-in clause, the lessee might want for the lease to
expressly provide that such time is extended during a Lease Termination Action.
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or forfeited as a form of remedy or relief.
7. Clause Providing for a General Waiver of Implied Covenants
A prospective lessee that wishes to protect itself from implied
covenant claims could consider bargaining for a clause that disclaims all
implied covenants. As previously discussed in this Article, it is wellaccepted that the express terms of a lease can preclude the existence of an
implied covenant. Courts from several jurisdictions have stated this.
Typically, such statements are made in cases that involve a lease that
imposes some express duty, and the court is addressing whether the
express duty precludes the existence of an implied covenant that imposes
a particular duty. For example, a court might consider whether an express
offset well clause precludes the existence of an implied covenant to protect
against drainage. There are far fewer cases involving leases that purport to
eliminate all implied covenants. But there a handful of such cases from
Ohio.
For example, a lease at issue in Bilbaran Farm, Inc. v. Bakerwell, Inc.
contained a clause stating:
This lease contains all of the agreements and understandings of
the Lessor and the Lessee respecting the subject matter hereof and
no implied covenants or obligations, or verbal representations or
promises, have been made or relied upon by Lessor or Lessee
supplementing or modifying this lease or as an inducement
thereto. 227
The lessee was operating three wells on the approximately 276-acre
property covered by the lease, but a portion of the property had not been
developed.228 The lessor brought suit in state court in Ohio, asserting that
the lessee had breached the implied covenant to fully develop the property.
The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff’s complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the motion and
the appellate court affirmed, holding that the lease’s general waiver
precluded the existence of an implied covenant to develop the property.229
In doing so, the appellate court from Ohio’s Fifth District rejected the
lessor’s argument that the lessee’s failure to further develop the property
was “unfair and inequitable.”230 The court noted that parties generally have
227.
228.
229.
230.

993 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist.).
Id. at 799.
Id. at 801.
Id.
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freedom of contract and that courts typically should not override the terms
of a contract.231 The court also cited a prior case that reached a similar
result.232
That prior case was Bushman v. MFC Drilling, an unpublished case
from the Ninth District Court of Appeals.233 The parties in Bushman
entered a lease in 1990 that covered about twenty-seven acres. About ten
of those acres were part of a drilling unit that contained a unit well that
produced in paying quantities.234 The lessor brought suit, arguing that the
lessee had breached an implied covenant to reasonably develop the
property because seventeen acres remained undeveloped. The lessee
moved for summary judgment, noting that a clause in the lease stated, “It
is mutually agreed that this instrument contains and expresses all of the
agreements and understandings of the parties in regard to the subject
matter thereof, and no implied covenant, agreement or obligation shall be
read into this agreement or imposed upon the parties or either of them.”235
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the lessor’s claims. On
appeal, the lessor argued that “public policy prohibits a general disclaimer
of the implied covenant to develop the leased property.”236 Thus, only a
clause that referred specifically to the implied covenant to develop the
leased premises could preclude the existence of such a covenant. Here,
asserted the lessor, the clause disclaiming implied covenants was too
“vague and general” to preclude the existence of an implied covenant. The
appellate court disagreed, concluding that, under Ohio contract law, a
general waiver should be sufficient and that no authority called for a
different result to apply for an oil and gas lease.237 The lessor in Bushman
also argued that, under the facts of the case, a general waiver of the implied
covenant to develop the premises was unconscionable. Relying on general
principles of contract law, the appellate court rejected this argument too.238
Appellate courts from two additional appellate districts have likewise
concluded that general waivers of implied covenants are enforceable.239
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 1995 WL 434409 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1995).
234. Id. at *1.
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *3.
239. See Belmont Hills Country Club v. Beck Energy, 2015 WL 1592999
(Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2015); Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 26
N.E.3d 1176, 1186 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2014); Taylor v. MFC Drilling, Inc.,
1995 WL 89710 (Ohio Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1995) (general waiver of implied
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Further, in two recent cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that
general waivers of implied covenants are enforceable. One of these was
Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., though the statement in that
case was dicta.240 The other case was State ex rel. Claugus Family Farm,
L.P. v. Seventh District Court of Appeals.241 In Claugus, the court stated
that there would not be an implied covenant of reasonable development
because the lease stated a period within which development must begin.
The court then stated, “In addition, there is specific language in the lease
that disclaims any implied covenant.”242 The court then declared, “For
these reasons, we hold that . . . the leases preclude the imposition of an
implied covenant of develop within the primary term of the lease.”243
These cases from multiple appellate districts, combined with the
statements from the Ohio Supreme Court, should suffice to make a general
waiver enforceable anywhere in that state.
In contrast to Ohio, most states do not have any cases that address a
general waiver of all implied covenants. As previously noted, though,
courts from several jurisdictions have stated that express lease clauses can
negate the existence of an implied covenant. Further, some states have
cases holding that a lease clause need not expressly negate an implied
covenant in order to preclude the existence of such a covenant. Instead, it
is sufficient that an express clause addresses the same type of performance
as that which is covered by the implied covenant. Thus, a clause that
expressly imposes a duty to drill a specified number of wells may preclude
the existence of an implied covenant of reasonable development. Such
cases could be cited in support of the proposition that a general waiver of
implied covenants is enforceable.
The only potential hurdle to the enforceability of a general waiver of
all implied covenants would be a conclusion by a court in some
jurisdiction that public policy so favors the protection of lessees that a
general wavier should not be enforced. But the authorities previously
cited, along with a general public policy favoring freedom of contract,
would weigh in favor of the enforcement of a general waiver of all implied
covenants.
Nevertheless, a state appellate court in Louisiana stated that, for
reasons of public policy, the parties to a lease do not have the contractual
freedom to preclude altogether the implied covenant of reasonable
covenants was effective); Holonko v. Collins, 1988 WL 70900 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th
Dist. 1988) (same).
240. 95 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2018).
241. 47 N.E.3d 836, 843 (Ohio 2016).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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development.244 But it is not clear that the statement is a correct expression
of Louisiana law, much less the law of any other jurisdiction, and the
statement certainly was dicta. The case did not even involve a lease that
purported to eliminate the implied covenant of reasonable development or
to eliminate all implied covenants. Instead, it involved a retained acreage
clause. Further, a Louisiana Supreme Court case cited by the appellate
court merely said that “it would require a very clear and unmistakable
contract” to preclude a duty to drill and market, not that public policy
would bar enforcement of a clause that disclaimed implied covenants.245
8. Clause Making an Express Disclaimer of Specific Implied
Covenants
Rather than disclaiming all implied covenants, a lease could disclaim
one or more specific implied covenants. Some leases do this by expressly
imposing upon the lessee a specifically defined duty involving the same
type of performance as is required by one of the implied covenants, but
without expressly disclaiming the implied covenant. It seems that
relatively few leases contain a clause that expressly precludes specific
implied covenants. Certainly, few cases deal with an express waiver of a
specific implied covenant, but one such case is Linn v. Wehrle.246 In Linn,
a lessor brought suit, asserting that the lessee had breached the implied
covenant to protect against drainage, but the lease expressly stated that
“there shall be no implied covenant to drill or protect lines” (to “protect
lines” was to protect against drainage). A state appellate court from Ohio
held that this clause precluded the existence of an implied covenant to drill
or protect against drainage. The parties to an oil and gas lease could use
similar language to expressly preclude one or more implied covenants.
Parties should also keep in mind that some court decisions hold that a
lease clause that expressly imposes a particular type of duty will preclude
the existence of an implied covenant for the same type of performance.

244. Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
245. Id. at 1211 (citing Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil Co., 87 So. 265 (La. 1921)).
The state appellate court also cited a United States Fifth Circuit case, but the Fifth
Circuit, sitting as an Erie court, merely stated that “[i]t would require a clear and
unequivocal clause in a lease” to preclude implied covenants. Id. (citing Williams
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970)).
246. 172 N.E.2d 288, 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1928).
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9. Restriction of Marketing Covenant
Traditionally, the implied covenant to diligently market required the
lessee to diligently seek a market and perhaps to seek the best price
reasonably available. In some states, however, courts have held that the
implied covenant to diligently market requires the lessee to absorb the
entirety of so-called post-production costs, unless the royalty clause in the
lease expressly provides to the contrary.
This issue arises most often with respect to the lease royalties to be
paid on natural gas. As noted in the “Primer” Section of this Article, the
royalty clauses of many oil and gas leases provide for a royalty on natural
gas to be paid based on the value of gas at the wellhead (or based on the
amount received on the sale of the gas, but “calculated at the wellhead”).
In the past, gas often was sold at or near the wellhead, and the calculation
of the royalty was straightforward. But now, natural gas is often sold at a
market a great distance away. Further, after the gas is brought to the
surface at the well, but before the gas is sold at a market some distance
away, the lessee often incurs “post-production” costs for tasks that
increase the value of the gas.
This leads to disputes regarding how to calculate the royalty. Lessees
typically use a “workback” method, estimating the value at the well as
being equal to the ultimate sales price, minus any post-production costs.
This method is accepted in several states, but in some jurisdictions lessors
have successfully argued that the implied covenant to diligently market
requires the lessee to absorb the entirety of post-production costs, or at
least those costs necessary to make the gas “marketable,” even if that
means the royalty is calculated based on a sales price that is greater than
the value that the gas had at the well. The lessee obviously would prefer
to avoid this result.
Under the basic tenets of implied covenant law, parties should be able
to preclude the existence of any implied covenant with express language
in the lease. Thus, in states that have held that the implied covenant to
diligently market generally precludes use of the workback method, lessees
who wish to pay a royalty based on the value of gas at the well should
include in the lease language that specifically provides for the royalty on
natural gas to be paid based on a sales price minus any post-production
costs incurred up until the time of sale. Such a clause might read (assuming
for purposes of this example a 20% royalty):
The royalty to be paid on natural gas that is produced and sold will
be one-fifth of the difference between the sales price and the postproduction costs that the lessee incurs for the gathering,
dehydration, sweetening, treatment, compression, and transport of
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such natural gas. The lessee will not be bound by an implied
covenant or obligation to absorb all costs up to the point that the
gas becomes marketable or to pay a royalty based on the price or
value of natural gas after the gas has been made marketable.247
B. Clauses to Benefit Lessors
Like lessees, lessors also can bargain for lease clauses that will provide
greater protection to them than would be provided by implied covenants
jurisprudence. Arguably, such clauses are outside the scope of an “implied
covenant” topic because the clauses that would provide such protection to
lessors typically either establish: express covenants; or convert the type of
performance that otherwise would have an implied covenant into a
limitation or condition, rather than a covenant. Nevertheless, because the
clauses that benefit lessors are closely related to the topic of implied
covenants, and often will have the effect of precluding the existence of an
implied covenant, some of the types of clauses that could benefit a lessor
are discussed below.
1. Termination if Breach is Not Corrected Within Specified Time of
Occurrence of Breach
Lessors can use lease language to provide themselves with greater
protection or benefits than are supplied under jurisprudentially-recognized
implied covenants. They can do so by imposing express duties that either
replace or supplement the implied covenants or by using express clauses
to convert the implied covenants from mere covenants to either conditions
or limitations.248 For example, a lessor could propose language that
provides that the lease terminates automatically if the breach of an implied
247. The language above is not quoted from a case or from an actual lease.
The language was drafted by the author of this Article. Others may be able to
improve on this language.
248. By definition, lessors generally cannot use lease language to obtain
greater protection from implied covenants than is provided by the
jurisprudentially-recognized implied covenants. If a lessor uses the lease to
expressly impose certain duties, those duties are express covenants, not implied
covenants. If a lessor includes in the lease language that provides for automatic
termination if a breach of an implied covenant occurs or if a breach is not
corrected within a certain time, that language converts the implied covenant into
a condition or limitation. Here, by “limitation,” the author refers to an event or
circumstance that leads to automatic termination of the lease, without any action
of the lessor. A “condition” would be an event or circumstance that makes the
lease subject to termination at the option of the lessor.
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covenant is not corrected within a certain amount of time from the first
date on which the lessee had an implied duty to act. For example, such a
clause might read:
Whenever the lessee is bound by an implied covenant, this lease
will terminate unless the lessee takes the actions that a reasonably
prudent operator would take within ninety days after the first
existence of circumstances that give rise to an implied duty to
act.249
A clause specifically directed to the duty to protect against drainage might
read:
If production from a well on lands other than the leased premises
begins draining hydrocarbons from beneath the leased premises,
this lease will terminate unless the lessor commences action to
protect the leased premises from drainage within ninety days of
the start of the drainage.250
Of course, a lessee should try to avoid the use of such lease clauses.
Assuming the lessor bargains for such a clause and has the bargaining
power to obtain the lessee’s consent, the lessee should make sure that the
clause gives the lessee an adequate time to act after the duty to act arises.
Otherwise, the lessee would have to anticipate potential duties in advance
of the duties arising.
2. Termination if Breach Not Cured or Cure Not Commenced Within
Specified Time of Demand for Cure
Rather than providing for automatic termination if the lessee does not
act within a specified time of a duty to act arising, a lessor could bargain
for a clause that provides for automatic termination or termination at the
option of the lessor if the lessee does not correct a breach within a specified
time of the lessor giving the lessee notice of the breach. Such a clause
might read:
249. This language does not come from an actual lease. It was drafted for
purposes of illustration by the author. Others may be able to improve on this
language.
250. This language does not come from an actual lease. It was drafted for
purposes of illustration by the author. Others may be able to improve on this
language. If the lessor does not own mineral rights at all depths, the lessor should
consider use of a clause that requires protection against drainage from wells
drilled at depths above or below the depths where the lessor has rights.
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If the Lessee shall fail for a period of sixty (60) days after written
notice given to it by the Lessor to comply with any provision of
this lease, the Lessor may, at his option, terminate this lease.251
If a lessor bargains for such a clause, it should consider replacing
“provision” with “express or implied covenant” or some similar language
to make clear that the clause applies to implied covenant duties, not just
express lease provisions.
3. Express Clauses that Specify Certain Duties
Implied covenants provide some protection or benefits to lessors.
Lessors can obtain additional protection by negotiating for express lease
clauses that either replace or supplement particular implied covenants.
Because such clauses impose express duties, and because this Article deals
with implied covenants, this Article will not attempt to address in any
detail the clauses that a lessor may wish to include in a lease. Nevertheless,
this Section of this Article will briefly identify some of the substantive
clauses that a lessor might wish to consider that modify, supplement, or
relate most closely to the types of duties imposed by implied covenants.
For example, to encourage more exploration or development,
prospective lessors can negotiate for a Pugh Clause. Such a clause alters
the general rule regarding the effect production (and drilling) from a
pooled unit. Under the default rule, production in paying quantities from a
pooled unit that includes a portion of the leased premises will be sufficient
to maintain the entire lease, even if portions of the leased premises are not
included in the unit. A Pugh Clause provides that production from a pooled
unit will not maintain the lease as to any areas that are outside the unit. A
Pugh Clause can have the effect of encouraging additional drilling by the
lessee in order to maintain the lease as to areas outside the pooled unit.
The following is an example of a Pugh Clause that was contained in a
lease in Texas:
In the event a portion or portions of the land herein leased is
pooled or unitized with other land so as to form a pooled unit or
units, operations on, completion of a well upon, or production
from such unit or units will not maintain this lease in force as to
the land not included in such unit or units. The lease may be
maintained in force as to any land covered hereby and not included
251. This clause appeared in Renner v. Huntington Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co.,
238 P.2d 35 (Cal. App. 1951), vacated by 244 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1952). See also
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 132, at § 682.1.
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in such unit or units in any manner provided for herein; provided
that if it be by rental payments, rentals shall be reduced in
proportion to the number of acres covered hereby and included in
such unit or units.252
There is no standard language for a Pugh Clause. Thus, the parties should
carefully consider the effect of the language used with respect to questions
such as: whether the Pugh Clause applies with respect to any unit well or
only unit wells not located on the leased premises; and whether the Pugh
Clause applies only when a unit includes both a portion of the leased
premises and also lands not covered by the lease, or whether the Pugh
Clause also will apply in the event that all the lands in the unit are covered
by the lease.
Prospective lessors should note that a Pugh Clause does not limit the
lease maintenance effect of a well that is not a unit well. Thus, if a well that
is not a unit well is located on the leased premises and is producing in paying
quantities, that well will maintain the entire lease. A prospective lessor may
want to consider negotiating for a lease clause that limits the lease
maintenance effect of a well that is not a unit well to a specified area. That
area could be a set number of acres or it could be based on the spacing rules
that apply in the area. For example, the lease maintenance effect of a lease
would be limited to 160 acres. The next question to answer would be the
boundaries of the area. One possibility is for the lease clause to require the
lessee to designate, within a specified time, the area that will be maintained
by production from the well. Other alternatives are to provide that a well
will not maintain the lease as to any area outside the governmental survey
section (if the well will be allowed to maintain 640 acres) or quarter section
(if the well will be allowed to maintain 160 acres) where the well is located.
But lessees should be wary of such a clause that is based on governmental
survey areas. Depending on the location of the well relative lease lines and
the section or quarter section boundary lines, limiting the effect of lease
maintenance in such a way might yield odd results.
Alternatively, if a lessor has the bargaining power, it can seek to have the
lease specify a minimum number of wells that must be drilled with a certain
time. Or, the lease could require a new well be started with a specified amount
of time from the completion of the prior well. The lease could provide that
once the lessee fails to begin a new well within the specified time, the lease
will terminate as to all areas not within either a pooled unit that has production
in paying quantities or within a specified area around any well that is
producing in paying quantities that is not a unit well.
252. Friedrich v. Amoco Production Co., 698 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App. 1985).
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A lessor should also consider limiting the effect of lease maintenance
by depth. Under the general rule, production in paying quantities from
anywhere on the lease will maintain the entire lease—both as to areal
coverage and as to all depths. That is, production that maintains the lease
as to a certain area on a map would maintain the lease as to all depths
beneath that area. Both a traditional Pugh Clause and the type of clause
discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph modify the general rule
by restricting the effect of lease maintenance, but the restriction only
applies to the areal extent of lease maintenance. In contrast, a “horizontal
Pugh Clause” regulates and limits the lease maintenance effect of
production or drilling by depth. The following language is an example of
a lease clause that combines a traditional Pugh clause with a horizontal
Pugh Clause, with the horizontal Pugh Clause language being showing in
italics:
This lease shall expire at the end of the primary term hereof or any
extension thereof by reason of operations being conducted at the
end of the primary term hereof as to all land outside any pooled
and/or proration unit assigned to any well theretofore completed
as a well capable of producing oil and/or gas and also shall expire
as to all depths below the deepest depth drilled theretofore
established in a well located on lands covered by this lease.253
A horizontal Pugh Clause can encourage the lessee to explore or develop
the leased premises at deeper depths.
Given that many states allow the use of the workback method for
calculating the royalty on natural gas, a lessor may wish to negotiate for
the royalty clause to provide that the royalty will be based on the price
obtained in the first arms-length sale of the gas or perhaps the first sale to
a buyer that is not an affiliate of the lessee.
In addition, prospective lessors may wish to negotiate for an offset
well covenant. An offset well covenant is a clause in a lease that requires
the lessee to drill an offset well in the event that a well located within a
specified distance of the leased premises begins producing oil or gas. Such
a covenant can provide protection to the lessor by imposing a requirement
on the lessee to drill a well, even without the lessor necessarily having to
prove that a reasonably prudent operator would drill such a well in order
to protect against drainage. If the parties agree to such a clause, the clause
should address issues as:

253. Albert v. Dunlap Exploration, Inc., 457 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. App.
2015).
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How close must a well on a neighboring tract be from the leased
premises in order to trigger the offset well covenant?
Is the specified distance based on the surface location of the
neighboring well, the wellbore’s nearest approach to the leased
premises, the perforation of the wellbore that is closed to the
leased premises?
Is the distance the same for oil wells versus gas wells?
Does the distance depend on whether the well has been
hydraulically fractured? and
Is it necessary that there be drainage in order for the express offset
clause to apply?
The following is an example of an offset well covenant:
In the event a well or wells producing oil or gas in paying
quantities should be brought in on adjacent lands and within one
hundred fifty (150) feet of and draining the leased premises, lessee
agrees to drill such offset wells as a reasonably prudent operator
would drill under the same or similar circumstances.254
Lessors should note, however, that this clause is probably too narrow to
provide much protection, and that the lessor therefore likely would want
to modify the language. There are several reasons why this clause provides
very little protection for the lessor. First, the spacing or setback rules of
many states will require a well to be more than 150 feet from a lease line,
so few wells will trigger the clause. Second, the clause only requires the
lessee to drill offset wells that a reasonably prudent operator would drill.
Thus, the clause adds nothing to the duties that would be imposed by an
implied covenant to protect against drainage. Further, the existence of an
express offset well covenant might prompt a court to conclude that the
express covenant precludes the existence of an implied covenant. If that
happens, the lessee might have a narrower duty to protect against drainage
254. Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 161 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App.
1942). An express offset well covenant in a Louisiana lease form contains almost
identical language. Paragraph 9 of Bath’s Form Louisiana Spec. 14-BR12A/12/79, which is available from M.L. Bath Company Ltd., Inc. in Shreveport,
Louisiana, states:
In the event a well or wells, producing oil, gas, casinghead gas or
condensate in paying quantities should be brought in on adjacent lands
not owned by the Lessor and within one hundred fifty feet of and
draining the leased premises, Lessee agrees to drill such offset well or
wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under the same or
similar circumstances.
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than if the lease lacked an express well covenant because an implied
covenant to protect against drainage often would require the lessee to
provide more protection against drainage than is required by the abovequoted express offset well covenant.
From the standpoint of the lessor, a much better example of an offset
well covenant is quoted in Adams v. Murphy Exploration and Production
Co.-USA.255 In that case, an express offset well covenant imposes duties
on the lessee whenever “a well is completed as a producer of oil and/or
gas on land adjacent and contiguous to the leased premises, and within 467
feet of the premises covered by this lease.” Note that, under this clause,
the lessee’s duties are triggered by a well much further from the leased
premises than in the other example quoted above. Further, the triggering
of the lessee’s duty does not depend on whether a reasonably prudent
operator would drill an offset well.
If the lessor only owns minerals as to certain depths, the lessor may
wish to include lease language that ensures that the duty to protect against
drainage and any offset well duty applies so as to protect the leased area
against drainage from a well located at a different depth, and not merely
to protect against drainage from a well located beneath a neighboring tract
of land.
In addition, given that most states that have addressed the issue have
rejected an implied covenant of surface restoration, prospective lessors
may wish for a clause that requires the lessee to take reasonable steps to
restore the surface to its original condition after the lease terminates and
possibly also during the life of the lease as to areas where drilling or
production is no longer active. This could include a duty to remove
equipment, tanks, piping, and concrete slabs, and to fill any pits and
perhaps restore sod or other vegetation.
Finally, if a lessor does negotiate to include such clauses in a lease,
the lessor should keep in mind that courts typically hold that a lease clause
that addresses a particular type of duty (such as by imposing a specific
duty) will have the effect of precluding any implied covenant, even if the
clause does not expressly negate the implied covenant. Thus, the express
clause might replace the implied covenant, rather than supplementing it.
For this reason, the lessor should consider some language to provide that
the implied covenants that otherwise would exist are not negated. Such a
clause might be an introductory phrase to a clause imposing a specific
duty, with the introductory phrase stating something like, “Without
negating the existence of any implied covenant that otherwise would exist,
255. 497 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016), rev'd, 560 S.W.3d 105
(Tex. 2018), opinion corrected and superseded (Nov. 30, 2018).
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the parties hereby agree that
” Or, the parties could supplement the
express duty with a duty to also take the steps that a reasonably prudent
operator would take. For example, after specifying express offset duties,
the lease could include a clause stating, “In addition, the lessee will drill
any additional offset wells or take other appropriate steps to protect against
drainage to the extent that a reasonably prudent operator would.”
CONCLUSION
Implied covenants are obligations that are not expressly stated in an
oil and gas lease, but that are nevertheless binding on lessees. Some of the
most significant implied covenant obligations require a lessee to develop
proven formations, explore new areas, protect the leased premises against
drainage, and diligently market any oil and gas discovered to the extent
that a reasonably prudent operator would. Parties can supersede or
supplement implied covenants with express lease clauses.

